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THESIS

SECURING THE PEACE AFTER CIVIL WAR

by

David M. Ware

March 2009

Thesis Advisor: Sophal Ear
Co-Advisor: Scott N. Siegel

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This thesis focuses on the problem of recurring conflict in post-civil war states and seeks to understand the actions undertaken by the international community to alleviate this problem. Specifically, the thesis asks if the strategies of democratization, peacekeeping, and economic assistance have a positive impact on a post-civil war state's likelihood of sustaining the peace. The thesis uses a multi-prong approach to explore this question. First, the author conducts a survey of civil war literature and identifies ethnicity, conflict intensity, and economic development as primary risk factors that lead to a recurrence of internal conflict. Next, the thesis examines the international community's democratization, peacekeeping, and economic assistance strategies and what impact the risk factors have on the execution of these strategies. Finally, the author offers recommendations to the strategies that can help mitigate the influence of the dominant risk factors.

The thesis argues that risks associated with ethnicity, conflict intensity, and economic development directly influence the effectiveness of the strategies used by the international community. The likelihood that democratization, peacekeeping, and economic assistance strategies will fail to sustain the peace can be assessed before the implementation of international action. Consequently, the ability to identify and assess these variables before the execution of policies allows the international community to identify high-risk environments and tailor their strategies to mitigate the risks.

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SECURING THE PEACE AFTER CIVIL WAR

David Ware
Captain, United States Air Force
B.S., United States Air Force Academy, 2000

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NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
March 2009

Author: David M. Ware

Approved by: Sophal Ear, PhD
Thesis Advisor

Scott N. Siegel, PhD
Co-Advisor

Harold A. Trinkunas, PhD
Chairman, Department of National Security Affairs

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ABSTRACT

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I. SECURING THE PEACE AFTER CIVIL WAR

A. INTRODUCTION

This thesis investigates why actions taken by the international community to stabilize post-civil war states fail to secure a sustained peace. To stabilize post-conflict states, The Center for Strategic and International Studies has identified four pillars of post-conflict stabilization. Intended as four distinct issue areas, these four pillars are: security, justice and reconciliation, social and economic well-being, and governance and participation.[1] Moreover, since the revitalization of international institutions since the end of the Cold War, the international community (i.e., the United Nations, the World Bank, and states) have commonly used three primary tools to accomplish these pillars. Collectively known as peace operations, these include: democratization programs, peacekeeping missions, and economic assistance.[2] This emphasis by the international community on sustaining the peace in post-conflict states has resulted in 45 peacekeeping missions undertaken by the United Nations (UN) and World Bank lending to post-conflict states increased 800 percent from 1980 to 2000 (see Figure 1).[3]

[1] Center for Strategic and International Studies and Association of the United States Army, *Post-Conflict Reconstruction* (2002).

[2] The international community also implements programs to support the justice and reconciliation pillar of post-conflict stabilization. However, unlike the other pillars, no single strategy has been accepted as the accepted method of fulfilling the pillar.

[3] World Bank aid to post-conflict states hovered at one billion dollars per year in the early 2000s and spiked to a high of four billion dollars in 2003. Department of Public Information, "United Nations Peacekeeping," http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/ (accessed November 20, 2008); Martin A. Weiss, *World Bank Post-Conflict Aid: Oversight Issues for Congress* (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 2004).

Figure 1. Post-Conflict Lending Operations Approved by Region (From: "The World Bank's Experience with Post-Conflict Reconstruction")[4]



Civil wars have become the most prevalent and deadly form of warfare today. To try to explain why states degenerate into internal violence, scholars have identified specific factors that indicate a higher likelihood of civil war onset. Additionally, research on civil wars reveals that 42 percent of civil war states fail to achieve a lasting peace.[5] The objectives of this thesis stem from the question of why states return to violence. First, it seeks to understand how the strategies implemented by the international community impact the likelihood of post-civil war states remaining at peace. Second, it seeks to explain why the strategies executed by the international community sometimes fail. Third, it offers recommendations on how to help the strategies succeed.

From a survey of civil war research, the author chose three variables that have statistically had the most significant impact on the likelihood of a post-civil war state

[4] Alcira Kreimer et al., *The World Bank's Experience with Post-Conflict Reconstruction* (Washington D.C.: The World Bank, 1998), 12.

[5] Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance in Civil War," *Oxford Economic Papers* 56, no. 4 (2004), 590.

returning to violence. Broadly categorized, these variables are ethnicity, conflict intensity, and economic development (the variables will be defined more specifically in Chapter II). The thesis then analyzes the impact of internationally led democratization, peacekeeping, and economic assistance programs on the post-conflict state's stability. Next, the thesis examines the impact of the risk variables on the international community's peace operations strategies. In doing this review, the author presents reoccurring impediments that arise because of the variables. Since these variables are identifiable before the implementation of peace operations, the author contends that policymakers can anticipate the occurrence of these specific risks and tailor their operations to mitigate the negative influence of these variables. A tailored approach that accounts for the specific conditions on the ground will, in turn, substantially increase the likelihood of the post-conflict state making the transition to a stable and peaceful nation.[6]

B. IMPORTANCE — WHY STUDY POST-CIVIL WAR STATES?

Over the past fifty years, warfare has transitioned from inter-state wars to intra-state violence or civil wars. In their book, *Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding in Post-War Societies,* James Meernik and David Mason note that while wars between sovereign nations dominated international politics for the previous three hundred years, "civil wars *within* nations — revolutions, secessionist wars, ethnic conflicts, and terrorism — have become the most frequent and deadly forms of armed conflict since the end of World War II" with four times more civil wars occurring as interstate wars.[7] Additionally, they note that while most of the world's interstate wars occurred within Europe and between the boundaries of the other great powers, the Third World has become the site of "almost all of the armed conflict that has punctuated the history of the

[6] The opposite is also true. If the risks are not present, the international community will have more flexibility in the approach that it uses within the state.

[7] T. David Mason and James D. Meernik, "Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding in Post-War Societies," eds. T. David Mason and James D. Meernik (New York: Routledge, 2005), 2.

last half century."[8] For a subset of nations, civil war is a chronic condition; about half of the civil war nations have had at least two and as many as six conflicts.[9]

C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES

This thesis focuses on the problem of recurring civil wars and seeks to understand the actions undertaken by the international community to alleviate this problem. Specifically, the thesis asks if the strategies of democratization, peacekeeping, and economic assistance have a positive impact on a post-civil war state's likelihood of sustaining the peace. From this overarching question, several other relevant questions emerge: What influences the effectiveness of these strategies? Can the factors that impact these strategies be identified before the execution of the policy? How can policymakers tailor these strategies to mitigate the risks? Have best practices emerged from previous peace operations that can be applied for future operations? What recommendations can be offered to increase the effectiveness of international efforts?

The thesis uses a multi-prong approach to explore these questions. First, the author conducted a survey of civil war literature to identify the primary risk factors that lead to a re-ignition of internal conflict. From this survey, the author selected three primary variables — ethnicity, conflict intensity, and economic development. Next, the author examined the literature surrounding peace operations to understand the objectives and effectiveness of the international community's democratization, peacekeeping, and economic assistance strategies.

The interaction between these significant risk factors and the actions taken by the international community are explored to see if and how the risk factors influenced the different strategies. This analysis identified four recurrent features that consistently reduced the effectiveness of the international action: (1) the reinforcement of factional

[8] T. David Mason and James D. Meernik, "Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding in Post-War Societies," 2-3.

[9] T. David Mason, "Sustaining the Peace after Civil War," *US Fed News Service, Including US State News* (December 27, 2007), iii.

divisions produced during the conflict, (2) the empowerment of extremist/militant leaders, (3) the funding of militant groups, and (4) the distribution of resources/positions along factional lines

Finally, the author looked at how variations in the strategies influenced the dominant risk factors. If a variation within a specific case appeared to mitigate the factor, the author assessed the strategy to determine if the modification could be used globally across cases. These observations are consolidated in recommendations in the conclusion of the thesis.

The author's hypothesis is that the likelihood that democratization, peacekeeping, and economic assistance strategies will fail to sustain the peace can be assessed before the implementation of international action. Risks associated with the factors present within the post-civil war state directly influence the effectiveness of the strategies used by the international community. The ability to identify and assess these variables before the execution of policies allows the international community to identify high-risk environments and tailor their strategies to mitigate the risks. Conversely, in post-civil war cases where the international community failed to account for these variables or implemented policies that were not appropriate due to the presence of specific hazards, the states will not have a statistically higher probability of remaining at peace than similar cases that did not receive international intervention.

D. LITERATURE REVIEW

Multiple topics hold relevance when writing a literature review for this topic. The most prevalent areas include theories on civil war and post-conflict stabilization.

1. Civil War Literature

The literature on civil war provides in-depth discussion and analysis of the reasons why individuals within a state's population choose to violently oppose their own governments and fellow citizens. Theorists have identified four main causes to explain the initiation of civil wars: ethnicity, grievances, mobilization, and greed.

a. Ethnicity

Proponents of ethnicity as a primary cause of conflict generally follow Nicholas Sambanis' definition of ethnic war "as war among communities (ethnicities) that are in conflict over the power relationship that exists between those communities and the state."[10] Chaim Kaufman adds to this definition to argue "opposing communities in ethnic civil conflicts hold irreconcilable visions of the identity, borders, and citizenship of the state. They do not seek to control a state whose identity all sides accept, but rather to redefine or divide the state itself."[11]

In the second edition of his often-cited work, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, D. L. Horowitz further defines the theoretical causes of ethnic violence. He presents ancient hatred adherents as those who believe ethnic conflict is rooted in old sources of enmity and memories of past atrocities. Primordialists view ethnicity as an exceptionally strong affiliation that charges interethnic interactions with the potential for violence. Proponents of primordial sociality theory argue that the strength of kinship ties promotes altruism in favor of the genetic evolution of the group. The clash of cultures (or civilizations) theory proposed by Samuel Huntington suggests that irreconcilable differences due to cultural gaps cause fear and conflict that beget violence.[12] Fear is also at the heart of the theory of the ethnic security dilemma, which suggests that territorial intermingling and mutual vulnerability exacerbate assurance problems that may lead to preventive wars by ethnic minorities who want to secede to increase their security. Finally, ethnic conflict may be the result of mobilization of ethnic groups by elites pursuing private interests and capitalizing on the availability of ethnic networks.[13]

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[10] Nicholas Sambanis, "Do Ethnic and Non-Ethnic Civil Wars have the Same Causes? A Theoretical and Empirical Inquiry (Part 1)," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45, no. 3 (June 2001), 261.

[11] Chaim Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars," *International Security* 20, no. 4 (Spring 1996), 138.

[12] Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 367.

[13] Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (University of California Press, 2000); Sambanis, *Do Ethnic and Nonethnic Civil Wars have the Same Causes*, 260-263.

b. Grievance

Other scholars, and much of the early research on internal conflict, emphasize what Collier and Hoeffler have termed grievance factors.[14] Starting with Ted Gurr's 1970 book, *Why Men Rebel*, scholars have argued that civil wars are caused by inequality, political oppression, deprivation, and conflicts over scarce resources that escalate into violence.[15] Additional proponents of the grievance theory include Edward Azar, Thomas Homer-Dixon, and Frances Stewart.[16]

c. Mobilization

Theorists such as Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow argue, however, that "grievances are not sufficient for organized internal conflict" and point to the need to have mobilized groups acting collectively.[17] Those who view mobilization as the key to civil unrest tend to minimize the importance of inequality or relative deprivation-type factors, and follow Tilly's argument that these conditions are, for the most part, always present.[18] Given consistent structural reasons for expressing discontent, the ability to mobilize resources determines the extent of internal conflict.[19]

d. Greed

Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler have developed an economic model of rebellion and have suggested that civil war might be fueled by self-interested behavior,

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[14] Collier and Hoeffler, *Greed and Grievance in Civil War*, 563-595.

[15] Patrick M. Regan and Daniel Norton, "Greed, Grievance, and Mobilization in Civil Wars," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49, no. 3 (June 2005), 320; Benedikt Korf, "Rethinking the Greed-Grievance Nexus: Property Rights and the Political Economy of War in Sri Lanka," *Journal of Peace Research* 42, no. 2 (March 2005), 202.

[16] Ibid., 202-203; Edward E. Azar, *The Management of Protracted Social Conflict* (Dartmouth Aldershot, Hampshire, England, 1990).; Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, *Environment, Scarcity, and Violence*, Princeton University Press, 1999); Frances Stewart, "Crisis Prevention: Tackling Horizontal Inequalities," *Oxford Development Studies* 28, no. 3 (2000), 245-262.

[17] Regan and Norton, *Greed, Grievance, and Mobilization in Civil Wars*, 320; Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action, and Politics* (Cambridge University Press, 1994).

[18] Regan and Norton, *Greed, Grievance, and Mobilization in Civil Wars*, 321; Charles Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1978).

[19] Regan and Norton, *Greed, Grievance, and Mobilization in Civil Wars*, 321.

such that rebels are motivated by greed rather than grievance.[20] Korf summarizes Collier's argument by stating that it is the abundance of lootable resources, rather than conflicts over scarce resources, that explains the incidence of civil wars: "while we may find grievances in many countries, it is only where the opportunities for economic gain — the opportunity and incentives to loot resources — coincide with these grievances that rebellion and violence are likely to take place."[21] A host of additional political scientists and economists, including V.L Elliot, Hávard Hegre, Marta Reynal-Queral, and Nicholas Sambanis, have pointed to a combination of economic decline, dependency on primary commodity exports, low per-capita income, and unequal income distribution as a potentially explosive combination, especially in a state where young males are abundantly available to emerge as "entrepreneurs of violence."[22]

2. Post-Conflict Stabilization

Disagreements exist over the level of impact that the international community can have on fostering lasting peace. After a series of heavily publicized peace operations failures in the 1990s, a multitude of researchers have examined the ineffectiveness of international intervention.[23] Analysts such as Marina Ottaway and Peter Savodnik argue that policy makers must recognize that our nation-building goals must be realistic and that sometimes peace and democratization are not always an achievable goal.[24]

However, Paul Collier argues that if possible, it makes good policy sense to prevent a state from deteriorating. He points out that states do not live in isolation and

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[20] Collier and Hoeffler, *Greed and Grievance in Civil War*, 563-595.

[21] Benedikt Korf, "Functions of Violence Revisited: Greed, Pride and Grievance in Sri Lanka's Civil War," *Progress in Development Studies* 6, no. 2 (March 2006), 203.

[22] Collier and Hoeffler, *Greed and Grievance in Civil War*, 563-595.

[23] See for example Chiyuki Aoi, *The Unintended Consequences of Peacekeeping Operations* (New York: United Nations University Press, 2007); Andrez Sitkowski, *UN Peacekeeping: Myth and Reality* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger Security International, 2006); R.E. Utley, *Major Powers and Peacekeeping: Perspectives, Priorities and the Challenges of Military Intervention* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2006); Douglas L. Bland, *New Missions, Old Problems* (Kingston, Ont.: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2004); Frederick H. Fleitz, *Peacekeeping Fiascos of the 1990s: Causes, Solutions, and U.S. Interests* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2002).

[24] Marina Ottaway, "Nation Building," *Foreign Policy*, no. 132 (September/October 2002), 16, 22-23.; Peter Savodnik and Marina Ottaway, "Can't Buy Me Democracy," *Foreign Policy*, no. 134 (January-February 2003), 8.

the impacts of state failure include spillover effects such as the spread of refugees, cholera, HIV/AIDS, drug trafficking, and terrorism into distant countries.[25] Further, James Dobbins argues that nation building is a viable option. He contends that the sharp overall decline in deaths from armed conflict around the world over the past decade points to the potential efficacy of nation building. He states that during the 1990s, deaths from armed conflict were averaging over 200,000 per year. Yet, due to effective nation-building efforts, by 2003 the number had come down to 27,000, a fivefold decrease in deaths from civil and international conflict. Thus, he argues, nation building can be an extremely effective tool in creating a foundation for lasting peace.[26]

Accordingly, they have produced an abundance of opinions, conditions, and policies that prescribe when nation building will both succeed and fail. Review of their research addresses an essential foreign policy question, as it helps policy makers understand the scope of factors that impact peace operations and concentrate resources on the areas that prove to be the most critical to a state's success. Additionally, researching this question can help identify counterproductive policies that have led to military coups, insurgent activity, and civil wars in the aftermath of failed peace operation efforts.

E. THESIS OVERVIEW

This thesis explores four major subjects: (1) the civil war state and post-conflict risk factors, (2) democratization strategies for post-civil war states, (3) UN peacekeeping missions, and (4) economic assistance in post-conflict environments. The chapter on civil war states seeks to present the reader with a basic understanding of civil war, the problems faced by states devastated by internal violence, and the factors that indicate a higher likelihood of renewed violence. Multiple but shared objectives exist for the chapters dedicated to democratization, peacekeeping, and economic assistance. Each chapter will: first, present the motivations and objectives the international community hopes to accomplish with each strategy; second, analyze the research that measures the

[25] Collier and Hoeffler, *Greed and Grievance in Civil War*, 563-595.

[26] James Dobbins, *The UN's Role in Nation-Building: From the Congo to Iraq*, RAND Corporation, 2005), xxxvi.

influence of each of the strategies on the likelihood of the post-conflict state sustaining the peace; third, examine how ethnicity, conflict intensity, and economic development have influenced the success of each approach; fourth, investigate the reasons why these factors are influential; and, fifth, provide recommendations on how the strategies can be modified to mitigate these risks.

All chapters thoroughly examine the question of why specific factors are influential. It is the author's belief that to successfully implement strategies that mitigate the risks, the research needs to go beyond tables that show a correlation exists, and instead add the details needed to understand why a specific factor impacts the strategy. Only after peacebuilders understand the reasons why a specific factor is important can they most effectively and efficiently tailor their strategy to mitigate the risk.

II. THE CIVIL WAR STATE

A. INTRODUCTION

Civil wars have important distinctions from both inter-state wars and communal violence. Collier et al. note that unlike international war, civil war is fought outside any structure of rules and entirely within the territory of society. Additionally, unlike communal violence, it implies a rebel organization equipped with armaments and staffed with full-time recruits. Such rebel armies usually have little option but to live off the land or finance their operations through illicit activities (i.e., kidnappings for ransom or narcotics trafficking). These features typically escalate the social costs and economic damage above the costs of either international war or communal violence.[27] This chapter captures some of the unique features that characterize civil wars. To accomplish this, the chapter is organized into the following five sections: (1) civil war definition, (2) discussion of costs incurred during civil war, (3) presentation of the legacy effects that occur due to internal conflict, (4) introduction of the factors that indicate the risk of renewed conflict, and (5) conclusion.

B. DEFINING CIVIL WARS

For this research, the thesis uses a definition of civil war consistent to that found in civil war literature. Civil war occurs when an identifiable rebel organization challenges the government militarily and the ensuing violence results in more than 1,000 combat-related deaths — at least five percent on each side. Appendix 1 provides a more thorough review of the many other considerations that underlie this basic definition.

C. THE CONSEQUENCES OF CIVIL WAR

1. Economic Costs of Civil War

During a civil war, society diverts resources from production to actions dedicated to survival or destruction. This characteristic causes a double loss: the lost growth that

[27] Paul Collier et al., *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy* (Washington DC: World Bank and Oxford University Press, 2003), 11.

occurs as resources are no longer available for economic development, and the loss that takes place from the destruction that ensues when these resources are instead used to conduct warfare.

Quantification of the first category indicates that increased government spending on the military during civil war directly reduces economic growth. Collier et al. find that during peace, the average developing country (defined as a country with less than $3,000 per capita GDP) spends about 2.8 percent of GDP on the military. However, this spending increases to an average of five percent during a civil war.[28] A 1997 IMF study estimated that an additional 2.2 percent of GDP spent on the military over a period of seven years (the length of a typical conflict) would cause the state to permanently lose approximately two percent of GDP.[29] Moreover, this estimate only includes the increase in government military spending; the result becomes greater if one also includes the resources controlled by rebel groups that are diverted from their primary activities.

However, the main economic losses that occur from civil war arise from the destruction inherent to violent confrontation. Rebel groups often target physical infrastructure as part of their military strategy, including infrastructure that has a significant impact on the population's economic well-being, such as power facilities, communication networks, and transportation facilities. Additionally, rebel and government soldiers typically loot and destroy housing, schools, and health facilities. Tilman Brück provides an example from the violence in Mozambique, where the conflict destroyed 40 percent of immobile capital in the agriculture, communications, and administrative sectors. While the pre-war transportation system provided foreign income from goods transported to the neighboring states of Malawi, South Africa, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe, the conflict destroyed or damaged 208 out of 222 units of rolling stock.[30]

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[28] Collier et al., *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy*, 14.

[29] Malcolm Knight, Norman Loayza and Delano Villanueva, "What Happened to the Peace Dividend?" *Finance and Development* (March 1997).

[30] Tilman Brück, "Macroeconomic Effects of the War in Mozambique" Queen Elizabeth House Working Paper no. 11, 1997).

Finally, one must consider the substantial economic impact that occurs due to individual material losses during civil war. Internal violence inevitably generates risks that cause segments of the population to flee their homes and often lose the few assets they possess. For example, in a 2001 survey of households in Uganda, Matovu and Stewart found that two-thirds of respondents lost all of their assets. They had their houses destroyed, household belongings such as bicycles and furniture looted, and their livestock stolen by soldiers.[31] Faced with the prospect of such losses, people attempt to protect their assets by moving their wealth abroad. Collier et al. found that prior to conflict, the typical civil war country held nine percent of its private wealth abroad; yet, by the end of the conflict this had risen to 20 percent.[32]

Further, the displacement caused by civil wars severs the social links that families and communities exercise to guide individual behavior. The disruption of these social structures weakens the constraints on opportunistic and criminal behavior. In a study undertaken by Michelle Cullen that analyzed the relationship between civil war and the transformation of social constraints in Somalia, Guatemala, Cambodia, and Rwanda; she found that non-combatants respond to an environment prevalent with criminality and opportunism by regressing to subsistence activities. Cullen explained that during conflict, individuals with assets faced a greater risk of being killed. Consequently, the population reduced investments and instead focused on minimalistic activities that were less vulnerable to capture.[33] As a powerful example, Collier et al. note that the subsistence sector increased from 20 percent of GDP to 36 percent during the civil war in Uganda.[34]

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[31] Stewart, *Crisis Prevention: Tackling Horizontal Inequalities*, 122-123.

[32] Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler and Catherine Pattillo, "Africa's Exodus: Capital Flight and the Brain Drain as Portfolio Decisions" *Journal of African Economies* 13, no. 2 (2004), 15.

[33] Michelle L. Cullen, *Violent Conflict and the Transformation of Social Capital* (New York: World Bank Publications, 2000), 12-15.

[34] Collier et al., *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy*, 16.

2. The Human Costs of Civil War

Unfortunately, economic losses are only one area of social costs experienced by a country during civil war. The most direct social costs are fatalities and population displacements. The percentages of civilian fatalities that occur during a civil war differ drastically from the inter-state wars of the twentieth century. At the beginning of the twentieth century, 90 percent of conflict casualties were combatants; however, starting with the civil wars of the 1990s, civilians account for 90 percent of the casualties.[35]

Azam and Hoeffler note that the increased proportion of civilian casualties and the extensive displacements that occur during internal conflict reflect the military practices used during civil war. First, they note that combatants may target civilians to plunder material to support their logistical needs. Furthermore, the rebels often use coercion to recruit new members and intimidation to secure material support from non-combatants, which causes displacement as the civilians flee to avoid conscription.[36] Moreover, this forced recruitment often targets the most vulnerable members of society, including children. In 2003, the UN estimated that around 300,000 underage child soldiers were currently serving in militias around the world.[37] Finally, they note that both government and rebel militaries sometimes deliberately target noncombatants to force the migration of civilians who could provide support to the adversary.[38]

These factors combine to produce a level of human suffering within the civilian population that is almost unimaginable. During the 1990s, civil wars have killed an estimated two million people in Sudan, one million in Angola, three to five million in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 150,000 in Western Africa, and 200,000 in Burundi. Internal conflict in Africa has contributed to more than 50 percent of the population being denied clean drinking water and half the population surviving on less than one dollar a

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[35] Edmund Cairns, *A Safer Future: Reducing the Human Cost of War* (Oxford: Oxford Publications, 1997).

[36] Jean-Paul Azam and Anke Hoeffler, "Violence Against Civilians in Civil Wars: Looting Or Terror?" *Journal of Peace Research* 39, no. 4 (July 2002), 461-485.

[37] Judith Kumin, "Africa at a Crossroads," *Refugees* 2, no. 131 (2003), 18.

[38] Azam and Hoeffler, *Violence Against Civilians in Civil Wars: Looting Or Terror?* 461-485.

day.[39] In addition, globally, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees provided assistance to over 20 million internally displaced persons and refugees in 2005 alone (see Figure 2 for a map of displaced people in Africa).[40] However despite assistance, the World Food Program reports that "an estimated 40 million Africans in Ethiopia, Eritrea, the Sahel, and West Africa face starvation."[41]

[39] Kumin, *Africa at a Crossroads*, 15.

[40] The UN Refugee Agency, *Measuring Protection by the Numbers*, 2006.

[41] Kumin, *Africa at a Crossroads*, 15.

Figure 2. Displaced Populations in Africa in 2003 (From: "Africa at a Crossroads")[42]



[42] Kumin, *Africa at a Crossroads*, 17.

D. THE POST-CONFLICT LEGACY

Unfortunately, the destructive impact of internal violence continues after the fighting stops. The disruption of economic infrastructure, governmental capacity, security, medical capability, and social networks create a persisting legacy of poverty and misery. These conditions, in turn, create limitations in the state's ability to recover from the conflict and instead create an environment that strengthens the influence of those in the society that call for and would benefit from renewed violence. Yet, even when the state remains in peace, the recovery process often takes decades. For example, Matovu and Stewart note that although Uganda maintained peace and experienced a comparatively rapid post-conflict recovery, even by the late 1990s, a decade after the resolution of violence, per capita income had only returned to its early 1970s level and the revival from subsistence practices had only started to occur. Additionally, when they interviewed Ugandans at the household level, almost two thirds of respondents indicated that they were currently worse off than they were before the war.[43]

1. The Economic Legacy

Several of the adverse economic effects that occur during civil war continue to impact the post-conflict environment. During the conflict, military expenditures rise from 2.8 to an average of 5 percent of GDP; however, once the conflict ends military expenditures seldom return to their pre-war level. During the first post-conflict decade, the average state continues to spend 4.5 percent of GDP on military expenditures. Cumulatively, over the first decade of peace, an extra 17 percent of a year's GDP is diverted for increased military spending.[44]

Second, capital flight typically continues in the aftermath of civil wars. Although it already reaches an average of 20 percent during a typical conflict, by the end of the first decade of post-conflict peace, capital flight had risen further to 26.1 percent. Collier et al. postulate a possible reason for this is that once a country has experienced civil war, it

[43] John M. Matovu and Frances Stewart, "Uganda: The Social and Economic Costs of Conflict" In *War and Underdevelopment*, eds. Frances Stewart, Valpy Fitzgerald and Edmund Fitzgerald (Vol. 2, 2001), 240-245, 270-284.

[44] Collier et al., *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy*, 21.

is at a much higher risk for renewed violence. Thus, even once peace has returned, people still want to move more of their assets abroad.[45] The same is even more prevalent for human flight. Civil war gives an impetus for emigration, but some of those emigrants (especially those that immigrate to more advanced countries) then provide a post-conflict channel for further emigration.

2. Political and Economic Institutions

Rebel leaders often justify their violence as a means to force political and economic changes upon the regime that will benefit the population as a whole. Thus, they state that the suffering that occurs due to their actions is a necessary price for the population to pay for the redeeming changes they will bring to the society in the future. Despite the wartime rhetoric, however, post-civil war states are characterized by ineffective political and economic institutions. This impact on political institutions is captured in Polity IV governance index. On a ten-point scale that indicates the extent political institutions are democratic, the typical developing state that is neither at war nor in postwar peace achieves an average core of 2.11, while states in their first decade of post-conflict peace only attain an average of 1.49. A related measure sponsored by Freedom House reinforces this finding. The Freedom House uses a seven-point scale where, in contrast to Polity IV, a low score indicates more political freedoms than a high score. Within this index, states held an average score of 4.79 prior to the conflict, but only attained a score of 5.66 after the war.[46] Thus, civil wars typically cause further deterioration rather than improvement of political institutions.

The economic impact of internal violence is quantified in the World Bank's Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA). The CPIA assesses economic policy on a five-point scale in four areas — macro-economic, structural, social, and public sector management — with a higher score indicating better policies. Low-income countries that are not at war and have not had a civil war in the past decade have an

[45] Collier et al., *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy*, 21.

[46] Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, "International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis," *The American Political Science Review* 94, no. 4 (December 2000), 779-801.

average CPIA sore of 2.75. However, post-conflict countries averaged only 2.29 for the first decade of peace. Although the numbers may appear close together, they actually reflect a substantial deterioration in policies. Moreover, all four policy areas are worse in post-conflict societies: their macroeconomic policies are less stable, their structural policies such as trade and infrastructure are less conducive to growth, their social policies are less inclusive, and their public sectors are poorly managed.[47]

3. The Social Impact

A third area that experiences a persistently adverse impact from civil war is the loss of social capital and the continuation of intense societal conflicts. As factions have been mobilized to kill other members of their society during the conflict, post-civil war society contains deep and cumulative social cleavages. Consequently, the conflict dampeners have been weakened — the population has lost its tradition of peaceful dispute resolution, factions now view their adversaries as morally inferior, and individuals regard other groups with distrust, detestation, and fear.[48] This has the effect of switching behavior from an equilibrium in which there is an expectation of honesty and fairness to one in which there is an expectation of manipulation and corruption. Once the norm of honesty has been lost, the incentive for impartial behavior in the future is greatly weakened.[49]

4. The Human Toll

Civil wars cause human suffering in many areas, including varying levels of physical and psychological trauma. However, the most accurate indicator of the human toll is the mortality rate; it is data more likely to be captured and it is consistently defined across cultures. In their study of infant mortality rates in post-conflict populations, Hoeffler and Reynal-Querol found a correlation between the length of the conflict and a lasting impact on the mortality rate. They found that during a typical five-year civil war,

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[47] Collier et al., *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy*, 22.

[48] Roland Paris, *At War's End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 168-175.

[49] Collier et al., *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy*, 21.

the infant mortality rate increased by 13 percent; however, this rate remained elevated and, in the first five years of peace, the rate remained 11 percent higher than the baseline.[50]

These results are collaborated in an in depth study conducted by Guh-Sapir and Van Panhuis that studied mortality rates following internal conflict among individuals residing as refugees, internally displaced people, and residents of the embattled country. They found that mortality rates were higher after conflict than before, and that adult mortality rate was generally even higher than the infant mortality rate. They note that:

> While it might be imagined that the rise in adult mortality is because of the greater exposure of adults to the risk of combat death, few of these adult deaths are directly combat-related. We can compare these increases in mortality with the estimates of death as a direct result of combat. The death of combatants is only a very minor component of the overall rise in mortality. These numbers confirm that civil wars kill far more civilians even after the conflict is over than the number of combatants that die during the conflict.[51]

Ghobarah, Huth, and Russett complement these findings in a 1999 study of the long-term health effects of civil war in a cross-national analysis of World Health Organization data on death and disability broken down by gender, age, and medical or type of disease. They found that civil wars have substantial long-term effects, even after controlling for several other factors, which are "overwhelmingly concentrated in the civilian population." They "estimate that the additional burden of death and disability incurred in 1999, from the indirect and lingering effects of civil wars in the years 1991–97, was approximately equal to that incurred directly and immediately from all wars in 1999." Moreover, they contend that the legacy effects of civil war create conditions that foster the lethality of infectious diseases. Thus, infectious diseases become the most important cause of indirect deaths of civil war; a killer that they found disproportionately

[50] Anke Hoeffler and Marta Reynal-Querol, "Measuring the Cost of Conflict," http://heisun1.unige.ch/sas/files/portal/issueareas/victims/Victims_pdf/2003_Hoeffler_Reynal.pdf (accessed January 19, 2009).

[51] Ibid.

affects women and children.[52] Table 1 shows the mortality rates due to disease among children under five years old during the post-conflict period and in the pre-conflict baseline.

Table 1. Mortality Rates among Children (From: "Measuring the Costs of Conflict")[53]

Population sample and year	**Disease**	**Mortality Rates**	
		Conflict	Baseline
Internally displaced in Somalia 1992	Measles	36.5	10.1
	Diarrheal disease	39.0	20.0
Kurdish refugees in Iraq, 1991	Diarrheal disease	74.0	22.9
Sudanese refuges in Northern Uganda, 1994	Meningitis	0.2	0.6
Rwandan refugees in Zaire, 1994	Diarrheal disease	87.0	20.0
Buthanese refugees in Nepal, 1992-1993	Respiratory Infectious	41.4	26.2
	Diarrheal disease	22.9	22.9
Residents in Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, 2000	Malaria	26.0	15.5
	Diarrheal Disease	11.0	20.0

E. CIVIL WAR RISK FACTORS

As the previous section discussed, the costs and destructive influence of civil wars continue to accrue long after the conflict subsides. As Collier et al. summarize:

> The country tends to get locked into persistently high levels of military expenditure, sees capital continuing to flow out of the country at an unusually high rate, and faces a much higher incidence of infectious disease. Even economic policies, political institutions, and political freedom appear to deteriorate.[54]

Consequently, the frequent legacy of civil war is a destabilized environment that fosters an increased risk of future civil war.

As shown in the literature review, the magnitude of civil wars has led researchers across disciplines to try to understand motivations behind internal violence. As a part of

[52] Hazem A. Ghobarah, Paul Huth and Bruce Russett, "Civil Wars Kill and Maim People—Long After the Shooting Stops," *American Political Science Review* 97, no. 2 (May 2003), 189.

[53] Hoeffler and Reynal-Querol, *Measuring the Cost of Conflict*, 14.

[54] Collier et al., *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy*, 32.

this research, scholars have analyzed the environmental conditions discussed above and identified specific factors that indicate a higher likelihood of factions within a state initiating a civil war. The following section provides a summary of the civil war research and groups the findings by the primary factors that influence the return to violence. Appendix 2 defines the methodology used to measure the primary variables. Appendix 3 provides an expanded table of the variables considered in the civil war literature. It includes the research consulted for this thesis, the findings for each study, and also groups the risk factors by primary categories.

1. Ethnic Factors

As illustrated in Table 2, multiple studies have found that the failure to successfully address ethnic factors is one of the primary reasons that post-civil war states fail.

Table 2. Ethnic Factors' Impact on Civil War Recurrence

	Total	**Significant, peace**	**Not significant**	**Significant, violence**
Ethnic Basis	8		2	6
Fractionalization	4		1	3
Dominance	2		1	2
Polarization	2			2

Analysis of the ethnicity variable provides statistical patterns that indicate when ethnic differences can be mobilized for violence. Collier and Hoeffler found that substantial religious and ethnic diversity significantly reduces the risk of identity-based civil wars. Controlling for other factors, they note that "a society is safer if it is composed of many such groups than if everyone has the same ethnicity and religion."[55] In this situation, the limited population of each ethnicity in proportion to the total inhabitants of the state discourages the members of the ethnicity from initiating hostilities with other groups; each ethnicity forms a minority that by itself does not militarily threaten other groups.

[55] Collier and Hoeffler, *Greed and Grievance in Civil War*, 563-595.

However, dominance by one group, polarization between competing ethnicities and religions, or the exclusion of significant ethnic groups from government, forebode dismally for the stability of a post-conflict state.[56] Collier and Hoeffler found that if the largest group in a multi-ethnic society formed the absolute majority, the risk of rebellion increased by approximately 50 percent.[57] Likewise, the ethnic polarization of societies also creates an environment prone to conflict.[58] Monavlo and Reynal-Querol found that a completely polarized society, divided into two equal groups, has a risk of civil war six times higher than a homogenous society.[59] Although their earlier work did not find a relationship, Hartzell and Hoddie's 2003 research found that "conflicts in which parties are divided along ethnic lines have a 413 percent greater risk of a return to war."[60]

2. Conflict Characteristics

Table 3 suggests that conflict intensity and conflict duration exert an inverse influence over the likelihood of civil war onset.

Table 3. Conflict Costs' Impact on Civil War Recurrence

	Total	**Significant, peace**	**Not significant**	**Significant, violence**
Conflict Intensity	3		1	2
Conflict Duration	3	2	1	

Two of the three studies suggest that the greater the conflict intensity, the greater the propensity towards future violence. Hartzell and Hoddie found that states that have

[56] Collier and Hoeffler, *Greed and Grievance in Civil War*, 563-595.; Elias Papaioannou and Gregorios Siourounis, "Economic and Social Factors Driving the Third Wave of Democratization" (2006).

[57] Collier and Hoeffler, *Greed and Grievance in Civil War*, 563-595.

[58] Dominance occurs when one group is larger than others, polarization occurs when society is split into two fairly equal groups. Paul Collier et al., *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy* (Washington DC: World Bank and Oxford University Press, 2003), 58.

[59] José G. Montalvo and Marta Reynal-Querol, "Ethnic Polarization, Potential Conflict, and Civil Wars," *The American Economic Review* 95, no. 3 (June 2005), 796-816.

[60] Caroline A. Hartzell and Matthew Hoddie, "Institutionalizing Peace: Power Sharing and Post-Civil War Conflict Management," *American Journal of Political Science* 47, no. 2 (April 2003), 328, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3186141.

experienced civil wars with a relatively higher number of battle deaths in each month of war, measured through the intensity variable, have a greater risk of the peace failing than states that have emerged from a less intense domestic war. An increase of an additional one thousand battle deaths per month (using a natural log transformation), leads to a 124 percent increased likelihood of a return to civil war.[61]

However, two studies also found that the longer the duration of the conflict, the greater the likelihood for sustained peace. Walters found that conflict duration had a significant effect on whether a given country experienced multiple civil wars. In the first case, longer and presumably more costly wars reduced the likelihood that a country would face a second, third, or fourth conflict.[62]

3. Economic Factors

In addition, Table 4 presents unanimous research findings that indicate increased economic development is associated with a decreased likelihood of civil war, while sustained poverty equates to a higher risk of violence.

Table 4. Economic Factors' Impact on Civil War Recurrence

	Total	**Significant, peace**	**Not significant**	**Significant, violence**
Development (ln)	9	9		
Poverty	5		2	3
Natural Resources in General	8		3	5
Oil	8			8

Collier and Hoeffler found a significant negative relationship between development, measured as per capita income, and the probability of civil wars. Additionally, Henderson and Singer found that the conflict-dampening impact of

[61] Caroline A. Hartzell, Matthew Hoddie and Donald Rothchild, "Stabilizing the Peace After Civil War: An Investigation of some Key Variables," *International Organization* 55, no. 1 (Winter 2001), 186.; Hartzell and Hoddie, *Institutionalizing Peace: Power Sharing and Post-Civil War Conflict Management*, 328

[62] Barbara F. Walter, "Does Conflict Beget Conflict? Explaining Recurring Civil War," *Journal of Peace Research* 41, no. 3 (May 2004), 379.

development, which may be barely evident in all states, is markedly evident in post-colonial states.[63] Their finding is corroborated by Auvinen, whose results from a logit regression utilizing the COW civil war data indicate a significant negative relationship between economic development and the likelihood of civil war for the 70 less-developed countries in his study.[64]

a. Poverty

Opportunities for rebellion can arise in environments with rampant poverty. Sambanis and Hegre find a robust relationship between poverty and political disorder.[65] This finding is supported by Collier and Hoeffler whose research suggest that the lower the per capita income, the greater the likelihood of civil war. Collier and Hoeffler also present two competing explanations for their finding — grievance or greed. They reject the grievance theory, which suggests that anger develops over political injustice and economic inequality, and this eventually explodes into rebellion. Instead, they emphasize the financial incentives that exist to initiate internal conflict. They contend that in impoverished societies it is inexpensive to recruit rebel forces, and the recruits "costs may be related to the income foregone by enlisting as a rebel."[66] Consequently, they conclude that rebellions are more likely when foregone income is unusually low.

b. Natural Resources

Statistically, secessionist rebellions are considerably more likely if the country has valuable natural resources, with oil being particularly potent.[67] Natural resources are seldom distributed evenly through the entire state, but instead are usually concentrated in specific territories. This leads to competing views of who owns the

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[63] Henderson and Singer, *Civil War in the Post-Colonial World, 1946-92*, 290.

[64] Auvinen, *Political Conflict in Less Developed Countries 1981-89*, 193.

[65] Hegre and Sambanis, *Sensitivity Analysis of Empirical Results on Civil War Onset*, 508.

[66] Collier, Hoeffler and Sambanis, *The Collier-Hoeffler Model of Civil War Onset and the Case Study Project Research Design*, 7.

[67] Ross, *Does Oil Hinder Democracy?* 325-361; Collier and Hoeffler, *Greed and Grievance in Civil War*, 563-595.

resources — the state as a whole or the specific locality. Depending on the value of the resources, benefits of remaining in the state, and the perceived costs in seceding, the inhabitants of the resource rich region have an obvious incentive to secede from the state and to keep the wealth for themselves.[68]

To compound this difficulty, human societies almost universally attach locality as a part of an individual's identify. This tendency can become more pronounced during civil wars as identities become hardened as a means to distinguish individuals as a potential friend or adversary. The division of society along factional lines means that specific factions will control previously discovered resources. Moreover, if new resources are discovered, a defined group is likely to exclusively control the territory where they are located.[69]

Consequently, rebel leaders emphasize and often exaggerate the potential gains from capturing control over the resources to mobilize popular support for secession based on identity claims. For example, Collier et al. notes that "all ethnically differentiated societies have a few ethnic romantics who dream of creating an ethnically 'pure' political entity"; however, the discovery of resources has the potential to "shift such movements from the margin of romanticism to the core agenda of economic self-interest."[70]

Additionally, literature presenting the concept of the "rentier state" offers an additional explanation of the significant impact of oil. This theory argues that because the funds from petroleum production flow directly into state coffers, petroleum states do not depend on their citizenry for public revenues or the payment of taxes. Rather, they tend to rule in an arbitrary and repressive manner. The recent examples in Venezuela and Nigeria suggest that even when the governments of oil states conduct elections, they possess the resources to corrupt the electoral process and thereby elude institutions

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[68] Macartan Humphreys, "Natural Resources, Conflict, and Conflict Resolution: Uncovering the Mechanisms," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49, no. 4 (2005), 508-537.

[69] Michael L. Ross, "How Do Natural Resources Influence Civil War? Evidence from Thirteen Cases," *International Organization* 58, no. 1 (Winter 2004), 35-67; Ross, *What Do We Know about Natural Resources and Civil War?* 337-356.

[70] Collier et al., *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy*, 60.

designed to induce political restraint. Consequently, governments often engage in high levels of repression and often attack their own people, which, in turn, creates social unrest and the increases the likelihood of rebellion.[71]

F. THE CIVIL WAR STATE CONCLUSION

Civil wars have a devastating impact on both the capacity of the state and the populations forced to endure the violence. Moreover, many of the destructive impacts continue even after the conflict has subsided. This devastation is generally unique from and more intense than that experienced due to interstate conflicts. However, the explosion in the level of internal violence since the conclusion of the Cold War has made civil war the prevalent type of conflict that exists in the world today. Unfortunately, history has shown that once a state has experienced a civil war it has a much higher likelihood of reinitiating the conflict than a similar state that does not have a history of internal violence. The international community has recognized the problem presented by civil wars and has developed standard strategies to implement in post-conflict states in an effort to help the state stabilize and remain at peace. The following chapters will show how specific factors identified in this chapter significantly impact these strategies, provide recommendations on how the international community can account for these risks, and, by mitigating these risks, increase the likelihood that the post-civil war state will remain at peace.

[71] See Mahdavy *The Patterns and Problems of Economic Development in Rentier States: The Case of Iran*, Beblawi & Giacomi *The Rentier State*, Chaudry "Economic Liberalization and the Lineages of the Rentier State," Shambayati "The Rentier State, Interest Groups, and the Paradox of Autonomy State and Business in Turkey and Iran," and Karl "The Perils of the Petro-State: Reflections on the Paradox of Plenty."

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III. DEMOCRATIZATION IN POST-CIVIL WAR STATES

A. INTRODUCTION

The central question of post-civil war societies remains political — how to construct a stable form of domestic power sharing and governance. Although civil war adversaries have agreed to terminate violence, the formerly warring factions will seek influence in the future political system and expect public goods from the state as a peace dividend. The task of international mediators is to help the parties assess the available forms of sharing power and help implement a political system that can help sustain the peace.

1. The Benefits of Democracy

In his 2001 review, Samuel Barnes notes that at this point in history several strong forces have made democracies the favored form of governance for post-conflict reconstruction. He outlines numerous reasons including:

(1) The prestige of democracy has never been higher. Most rulers claim to be democrats of some genre. Except in a few scattered marginal states, only democracy possesses legitimacy at the ideological level. The twentieth-century struggles between alternative political and economic ideologies have largely subsided. This favorable image of democracy is demonstrated by public opinion polls almost everywhere.[72] Apart from a few theocracies, alternative systems possess little political or intellectual appeal. Political disputes today are more likely to concern the definition of the community than the centrality of democracy.

(2) The operating principles of democracy are familiar, even at the local level. Though debate over the modalities of achieving democracy continues, especially in fractured societies, there is general agreement on the basic features of democratic participation.

[72] In surveys of the 1990s, residents of 50 countries were asked to react to statements about democratic political systems. The statement that "democracy may have problems but it's better than any other form of government" gained agreement or strong agreement from 73 percent or more of the population in 49 countries. Inglehart concludes that "democracy has become virtually the only model with global appeal." Ronald Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997).

(3) Democracy is generally associated with economic well-being. Most successful democracies today are prosperous, and the aspiring democracies want to be. Generational replacement will presumably strengthen democracy as long as economic progress lasts-for economic growth is linked to globalization, and openness to private-sector development and information exchange, strengthening civil society.[73]

Additionally, the democratic theorists contend that as a form of government, democracies are the most effective in diffusing internal conflict than other forms of government, a characteristic that is highly desirable in a post-civil war state. The theory states that the institutions and processes of an elected form of government defuse internal conflict by providing opposition movements with peaceful, institutionalized means to pursue their interests and the opportunity to win control over and/or influence the government through free and fair elections.[74] Accordingly, for all the reasons discussed, policymakers within the international community have made the establishment of a democratic government one of the standard practices for post-civil war states.

2. Potential Pitfalls of Democratization

However, Barnes also notes that democratization has a potential dark side. He states that the long-term consequences of poor economic performance on new democracies are unknown but potent with political unrest. Especially in post-conflict transitions, successful economic growth anchors the chances for democratic government. If democracy does not produce prosperity, at least in the medium-term, it is likely to lose legitimacy.[75] Moreover, the countries that experienced post-World War II civil wars bear little resemblance to the original pioneers in the development of democracy, and they differ as greatly among themselves. Some seem poorly endowed to make democracy work; many are economically underdeveloped; linguistically, religiously, and ethnically

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[73] Samuel H. Barnes, "The Contribution of Democracy to Rebuilding Postconflict Societies," *The American Journal of International Law* 95, no. 1 (January 2001), 87.

[74] Michael W. Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," in Richard K. Betts, ed., *Conflict after the Cold War: Arguments on Causes of War and Peace*, 3rd ed., New York: Pearson Longman, 2008, 135-149; Terry Lynn Karl, "Electoralism," in Richard Rose, ed., *International Encyclopedia of Elections*, Washington D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 2000.

[75] Ibid., 87.

divided; lacking in natural resources; and often deficient in economic, human, and social capital. Some must also create a market economy or engage in nation building. Despite these risks, Roland Paris criticizes that leaders within the international community continue to act on their belief that a democratic government fosters peace within a state. This dogmatic faith has led policymakers to unrelentingly pursue elections as a standard practice in peace operations, regardless of the preconditions that existed in the state prior to external involvement.[76]

B. CHAPTER OVERVIEW

This chapter considers the cautions voiced by Barnes and Paris, and explores the influence that risk factors have on post-conflict democratization efforts. The chapter has the following objectives from this research: (1) to consolidate and present the findings from these studies to determine if democratization efforts in states that have recently experienced a civil war have fostered durable peace; (2) to provide a summary of the primary civil war variables that influence the likelihood of successful democratization; and (3) to analyze these findings to understand the underlying issues that determine if a state will remain peaceful or return to violence.

From this process, the chapter challenges the assumption that democratization is a panacea for post-civil war violence. In contrast, it will demonstrate that specific factors that existed during the conflict have a significant influence on the potential success of the democratization effort. Moreover, the research indicates that, as a whole, democratic reforms immediately following civil war have not fostered durable peace. Quite the opposite, circumstances within the post-civil war state can create an environment where the contestation of power indigenous to the democratic process actually increases the likelihood that factions within the state will resume fighting. Consequently, the thesis identifies conditions that peacebuilders should address prior to pursuing elections and liberal democratic reforms within the state. Finally, the thesis concludes with recommendations that policymakers could consider to account for these risks and help a newly formed government survive the transition to a mature democracy. As a minimum,

[76] Paris, *At War's End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict*, 164.

it argues that in high-risk environments, peacebuilders need to shape the environment, establish a minimum level of maturity in state institutions, and design an electoral process that promotes collaboration prior to holding elections.

C. THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE THEORY

The domestic component of the democratic peace theory is founded on the assumption that opposition movements need not resort to organized violence within democratic states because they can pursue redress of their grievances through elections. Moreover, the theory's advocates suggest that elected leaders have an electoral incentive to accommodate the demands of aggrieved groups in order to win their votes and thereby enhance their own prospects of victory at the polls. Thus, the theory establishes elections as the foundation that makes peace more sustainable and reduces the probability of a relapse into internal violence. Consequently, the international community has made elections a priority in post-civil war states.

In addition, Steven Poe and Neal Tate note that mature democracies also contain institutional and constitutional constraints on the state's police power. Thus, he argues these institutions limit the ability of democratic states to repress opposition movements.[77] As a result of this thesis research, the author would suggest that Poe and Tate have identified one of the critical, but often ignored requirements to successfully establishing a democratic system of government in post-conflict states. Without established institutions, a government does not have the means to impartially and consistently address the grievances of the governed. Additionally, in the absence of empowered institutions, elections alone are not sufficient in providing the safeguards needed to provide accountability between the regime and the governed — those in power can manipulate the system to maintain their grip on power. Consequently, an elected regime that is not supported by effective institutions often returns to violent coercion as the primary means of exercising control — the government does not have the infrastructure required to successfully deliver public goods to their population nor does it have

[77] Steven C. Poe and C. Neal Tate, "Repression of Human Rights to Personal Integrity in the 1980s: A Global Analysis," *American Political Science Review* 88, no. 4, December 1994, 853-72.

restraints on its use of violence on its population. As a result, we see post-conflict states returning to civil war after the conclusion of elections.

D. THE IMPACT OF DEMOCRATIZATION

Table 5 presents the impact of a democratic form of government and democratic reforms on civil war onset.

Table 5. Government Structure's Impact on Civil War Recurrence

	Total	Significant, peace	Not significant	Significant, violence
Democratic form of government	4		2	2
Democratic reforms	3		1	2

Of four studies that analyzed the relationship between democratic governance and sustained peace, two found no significant impact and the other two found that a democratic form of government actually increased the likelihood of renewed violence. Specifically, Schneider and Wiesehomeier found that a presidential form of democratic governance increased the probability that factions within the state would reinitiate the conflict.[78] Additionally, Henderson and Singer found that states that fail to make the transition to a mature democracy and get stuck as a semi-democracy also have an increased likelihood of returning back into civil war.[79] Further, two of the three studies that examined the impact of democratization in the aftermath of a civil war found that the reforms also increased the probability of violent conflict.

However, not all states that institute democratic reforms degenerate back into violent conflict. Additionally, although government transformation increases the likelihood of violence, policymakers could determine that the benefits of expeditiously establishing a democracy within the post-conflict time period could outweigh the risks.

[78] Gerald Schneider and Nina Wiesehomeier, "Rules that Matter: Political Institutions and the Diversity-Conflict Nexus," *Journal of Peace Research* 45, no. 2 (2008), 198.

[79] Henderson and Singer, *Civil War in the Post-Colonial World, 1946-92*, 289.

Consequently, in the governance section, the thesis identifies areas that peacebuilders should evaluate that directly impact the probability of democratic reforms influencing the state's likelihood of regressing into renewed warfare.

E. ANALYSIS OF RISK FACTORS

1. Why Does Democracy Not Sustain the Peace in Post-Civil War Situations?

While democracy requires the losers of a specific election to accept their defeat, it also implies that a group has a reasonable expectation of winning control of the government or forming part of a governing coalition at some point in the foreseeable future. If losing parties instead conclude that they are relegated to permanent opposition status, the payoffs from resuming the conflict can appear more attractive than what they can expect to gain by accepting the status quo as the permanent minority and sustaining a peace that denies them the prospect of ever leading a governing coalition. [80] Under these circumstances, a minority may resort to actions outside the political realm to challenge the dominance of the majority. The majority may then feel justified in repressing that minority. An escalating cycle of repression and violence may ensue, culminating in the return to civil war.

In addition, multiple strong institutions are associated with the effective dispersion of power. Hartzell notes that "a number of states in which civil war has broken out are weakly institutionalized–a problem that is likely to be even more severe in the aftermath of civil war." [81] Barnes argues that how institutions perform is critical to the success of post-conflict democratization. He cautions that a new formal constitution does not constitute the sum total of needed institutional growth, especially in the aftermath of conflict. In societies with thin institutional cultures, which are often the case in new democracies, actors and factions often find it easy to manipulate institutional instruments to their own benefit. The absence of strong institutions encourages

[80] Mason and Meernik, *Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding in Post-War Societies*, 25.

[81] Caroline A. Hartzell, "Structuring the Peace: Negotiated Settlements and the Construction of Conflict Management Institutions," In *Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding in Post-War Societies*, Mason, T. David; Meernik, James D. ed. (New York: Routledge, 2006), 47.

opportunistic public and private actors to discount the future and maximize immediate gains.[82] This unconstrained corruption destroys both the capacity and legitimacy of the state, and creates an incomplete transition to institutionalized democracy. Hegre notes that in such states, which he labels semi-democracies, factions are required to use self-help mechanisms to receive public goods. These characteristics explain why semi-democracies have a higher probability of civil war than either democracies or autocracies.[83]

a. Ethnicity

Schneider and Wiesehomeier found that both ethnic dominance and ethnic fractionalization provide the biggest challenge to a democratic country, and these ethnic factors combined with majoritarian voting rules make civil war much more likely. [84] Accordingly, Schneider and Wiesehomeier find that the greater the number of political parties the lower the risk of renewed conflict, with a minimum of four parties needed to achieve the threshold.[85] Additionally, Papaioannou and Siourounis contend that religious fractionalization hinders democratization in the first place.[86]

The hardening of identities and the potential of creating a permanent minority are especially prevalent features of ethnic civil wars that exacerbate the difficulties in establishing a stable post-conflict state. Chaim Kaufman explains that:

> The difference is the flexibility of individual loyalties, which are quite fluid in ideological conflicts, but almost completely rigid in ethnic wars….War hardens ethnic identities to the point that cross-ethnic political appeals become futile….Ethnic wars also generate intense security dilemmas, both because the escalation of each side's mobilization rhetoric

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[82] Barnes, *The Contribution of Democracy to Rebuilding Postconflict Societies*, 96-97.

[83] Håvard Hegre et al., "Toward a Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change, and Civil War, 1816-1992," *The American Political Science Review* 95, no. 1 (March 2001), 42.

[84] Gerald Schneider and Nina Wiesehomeier, "Rules that Matter: Political Institutions and the Diversity-Conflict Nexus," *Journal of Peace Research* 45, no. 2 (2008), 198.

[85] Ibid., 198.

[86] Elias Papaioannou and Gregorios Siourounis, "Economic and Social Factors Driving the Third Wave of Democratization," 2006.

> presents a real threat to the other, and even more because intermingled population settlement patterns create defensive vulnerabilities and offensive opportunities.[87]

Ethnic civil wars differ from ideologically based civil wars when the benefits of victory are more indivisible. Accordingly, Hegre found that ethnically based civil wars are roughly twice as likely to recur as those that are not ethnically based.[88]

Further, Wantchekon and Neeman's findings imply that the heterogeneity of the electorate is a necessary condition for a democratic enforcement mechanism to emerge.[89] This agrees with Lijphart's observation that societies in which the primary cleavage is ethnicity and that contain very few ethnic groups are less likely to democratize than those divided along numerous ethnic groups or those with cross-cutting cleavages.[90] The results imply that democracy will persist as long as elections remain competitive. However, unless the electorate is heterogeneous, competing factions will not develop that have a reasonably high likelihood of winning democratic elections. Conversely, if coalitions harden or if one coalition becomes too small, it will defect and democracy will collapse.

Consequently, political participation is often not a sufficient remedy to solve the internal tensions of ethnically divided countries.[91] In contrast, under some circumstances democratic competition can exacerbate ethnic conflict. Jack Snyder argues that democratization exacerbates ethnic violence by tempting politicians to "play the ethnic card" in order to avoid challenges and consolidate their rule.[92] This line of argument is continued by Donald Horowitz, who observes that ethnic divisions

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[87] Kaufmann, *Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars*, 136-175.

[88] Hegre et al., *Toward a Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change, and Civil War, 1816-1992*, 40-41.

[89] Leonard Wantchekon and Zvika Neeman, "A Theory of Post-Civil War Democratization," *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 14, no. 4 (October 2002), 458.

[90] Arend Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration* (New York: Yale University Press, 1977).

[91] Schneider and Wiesehomeier, *Rules that Matter: Political Institutions and the Diversity-Conflict Nexus*, 194.

[92] Mark R. Beissinger, "A New Look at Ethnicity and Democratization," *Journal of Democracy* 19, no. 3 (July 2008), 90.

have become salient with groups mobilized in exclusive ethnic groups to conduct violence against another ethnicity during the civil war.

As a result, political parties form along ethnic lines, which make the consolidation of democracy problematic. Efforts by party leaders to form coalitions across ethnic lines or attempts to forge multiethnic parties leave moderate leaders vulnerable to challenges from extremists within their own ethnic group. Political candidates who make appeals across ethnic lines lose more votes by challengers who stoke fears within their own ethnic group by playing "the ethnic card" than they can gain from other ethnicities. With an ethnically based party system, elections can denigrate into little more than an ethnic census. [93] Minorities become vulnerable to the tyranny of the ethnic majority unless institutional protections are established both on paper in the constitution and in practice.

b. Conflict Intensity

Hartzell and Hoddie hypothesize that the importance of this variable is attributable to security concerns: the higher the casualty rate and the greater the sunk costs, the more concerned groups will be about their safety.[94] Democratic competition requires a minimal degree of trust in your adversaries. However, Hartzell and Hodie state that "wars with high human costs are likely to produce pronounced feelings of insecurity, very low levels of trust, and deep concern about the future."[95] As a result, the factions will have more difficulty trusting the opposition and committing to peaceful democratic competition. These concerns mean that former adversaries will have limited enthusiasm for cooperating in the interest of managing future conflict. Participants in the settlement may also be more prone to interpret the behaviors of their former adversaries as hostile and thus be predisposed to a return to conflict.

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[93] Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict.*

[94] Caroline A. Hartzell, Matthew Hoddie and Donald Rothchild, "Stabilizing the Peace after Civil War: An Investigation of some Key Variables," *International Organization* 55, no. 1 (Winter 2001), 186; Caroline A. Hartzell and Matthew Hoddie, "Institutionalizing Peace: Power Sharing and Post-Civil War Conflict Management," *American Journal of Political Science* 47, no. 2 (April 2003), 328.

[95] Ibid.

c. Economic Development

Collier's finding of underdevelopment as a primary precipitant of civil war suggests that democratization of high risk states requires a multi-faceted conflict prevention strategy that also focuses on development. The failure to adopt a comprehensive approach can lead to policies where the actions taken to alleviate problems related to one class of factors (i.e., economic development) exacerbate difficulties related to other factors (i.e., political stability). Often post-civil war states turn to international organizations for assistance in economic development and stabilization. However, Auvinen's analysis of 70 less developed states from 1981 to 1989 implicated the International Monetary Fund's high-conditionality structural-adjustment programs in generating so much political instability that the programs created worse political and sometimes economic conditions within the state than they had experienced without them.[96] The failure of the international community to consider these inter-relationships has contributed to the suffering of the state's population, which in turn spawns domestic conflict during a period when a newly established government has limited capacity and is highly vulnerable to collapse.

Hegre & Sambanis provide an example of these inter-relationships; they explain that wealthier countries have more resources at their disposition for investment in social insurance and other forms of redistribution with the aim to alleviate social tensions.[97] Additionally, Collier & Hoeffler note that highly developed countries have a much broader tax base than developing economies, which contributes to increased state capacity to address factors that could lead to civil war (i.e., the ability to provide a social safety net to underprivileged minorities and increased coercive capacity to counter violent opposition to the government).[98]

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[96] E. Wayne Nafziger and Juha Auvinen, "Economic Development, Inequality, War, and State Violence," *World Development* 30, no. 2 (2002), 157.

[97] Havard Hegre and Nicholas Sambanis, "Sensitivity Analysis of Empirical Results on Civil War Onset," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50, no. 4 (August 2006), 508, (accessed November 17, 2007).

[98] Collier and Hoeffler, *Greed and Grievance in Civil War*, 563-595.

F. DEMOCRATIZATION CONCLUSION

Democratization does not provide a panacea for peace in post-conflict states. In contrast, the competition that occurs through the democratic contestation of power creates parties organized according to the factions that existed during the conflict. The contestation between these factions during elections can increase the likelihood of renewed violence in states that have undergone ethnic or intense conflict. In addition, extremist leaders typically hold more influence than moderate leaders in a post-conflict environment. By using rhetoric that presents the opposition parties as threats and appeals to common identity features such as ethnicity, extremist politicians can motivate their constituency through fear and paint moderates as weak or as agents of the opposition.

Finally, democratization can also increase the probability of renewed violence if the implementation of democratic reforms creates groups that become a permanent minority or brings inequitable distribution of public goods. In an environment with parties determined by unchanging identity features such as ethnicity, a minority party has no chance of gaining power. As a consequence, the majority party can relegate the minority to the sidelines of power and implement policies that discriminate against the minority population. The weakness of institutions in post-civil war states also contributes to this situation; for example, an ethnic majority can gain control of the nascent institutions and use them to reinforce their power and the distribution of public goods to their faction.

Consequently, peacebuilders must appraise the conditions that exist within a state in order to identify the risk factors that could sabotage the possibility of sustained peace and future mature democracy. The presence of these variables would suggest that implementation of democratization programs could severely destabilize a state. However, this does not mean that governance changes cannot be pursued; the final chapter of this thesis will provide recommendations on how to mitigate the risks that exist because of these variables.

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IV. PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS IN POST-CIVIL WAR STATES

A. INTRODUCTION

The four pillars of post-conflict reconstruction — governance and participation, security, justice and reconciliation, and social and economic well-being — are all inextricably linked, and a positive outcome in each area depends on successful integration and interaction across them. None-the-less, security "is the foundation on which progress in the other issue areas rests."[99] Security encompasses the provision of collective and individual security to the citizenry and to the assistors. However, post-conflict situations, by definition, have at their core a significant security vacuum that is often the proximate cause for external intervention. Indigenous security institutions are either unable to provide security or are operating outside generally accepted norms. Consequently, tens of thousands of international military personnel are deployed across the globe in peacekeeping operations authorized for the purpose of filling the security vacuum left in post-civil war states.[100]

1. The Rise in Peacekeeping Missions

In 2008, the United Nations approved a 7.3 billion dollar peacekeeping budget — the largest peacekeeping budget in the organization's history — that will field 90,000 uniformed personnel for operations across the globe. In terms of both money and personnel, this represents a ten percent increase from the previous year and close to a threefold increase since 2003. "In perspective, the peacekeeping budget is now three times as high as non-military expenditure by the UN."[101]

This increase represents a second surge in UN peacekeeping missions over the past decade. During the Cold War, rivalry between the superpowers limited the UN's

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[99] Scott Feil, "Building Better Foundations: Security in Postconflict Reconstruction," *The Washington Quarterly* 25, no. 4 (Autumn 2002), 97.

[100] Ibid., 97-98.

[101] Harvey Morris, "UN Peacekeeping in Line of Fire," *Financial Times,* May 17, 2008.

ability to coordinate an international response to conflicts. However, after the Soviet collapse, the UN saw its role reenergized and peacekeeping missions in the 1990s surged, with missions authorized for conflicts in Cambodia, Somalia, the Balkans, and elsewhere. Nonetheless, the UN's ability to conduct peacekeeping missions did not live up to expectations, and failures in the mid-1990s caused the UN member states to withhold support for future missions.[102] This changed when the 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States illuminated the reality that instability within distant states can translate to tragedy at home. Consequently, the UN has once again become the default organization to respond to the conflicts simmering in many parts of the world.

2. Opposing Views on the Effectiveness of UN Peacekeeping Missions

There are both opponents and advocates to the latest resurgence in UN peacekeeping missions.[103] Opponents such as Trevor Findlay argue that the failure of UN peacekeeping missions undertaken in Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia, and Sierra Leone indicate that the UN cannot adequately undertake complex peacekeeping missions. He argues that "the use of force by UN peacekeepers has been marked by political controversy, doctrinal vacuousness, conceptual confusion, and failure in the field," and the UN has lost its moral imperative due to the gross human rights violations conducted by UN peacekeepers.[104] In contrast, proponents of peacekeeping argue that the failures, while dramatic, are the exception, and UN peacekeeping missions are a critical tool for securing the peace in post-conflict states. For example, Scott Feil argues that when United States military personnel have been involved in these operations "the record shows that successes outweigh failures." Moreover, he emphasizes that because of peacekeeping operations "people stop killing, and many more stop dying" making the operations "the difference between life and death for hundreds of thousands of people."[105]

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[102] Harvey Morris, "UN Peacekeeping in Line of Fire," *Financial Times*, May 17, 2008.

[103] See for example Trevor Findlay, *The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations* or Frederick Fleitz, *Peacekeeping Fiascoes of the 1990s: Causes, Solutions, and U.S. Interests.*

[104] Trevor Findlay, *The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 389-390.

[105] Feil, *Building Better Foundations: Security in Postconflict Reconstruction*, 97.

B. CHAPTER OVERVIEW

In truth, both camps can point to examples and both are prone to selection bias as they argue in support of their position. However, a problem occurs in that the examples only include cases where peacekeeping missions have deployed and do not consider how the results compare to similar situations where the warring parties have been left to their own devices. This chapter explores a similar question to the one presented by many of these authors: "Do UN peacekeeping operations contribute to securing a sustained peace in post-civil war states?" In addition, it also explores how the risk factors prevalent in the conflict influence the peacekeeping mission.

To answer these questions, this chapter analyzes empirical data on how effective peacekeeping missions are in securing lasting peace in post-conflict states. Additionally, within these cases it looks for data trends that indicate how ethnicity, conflict intensity, and economic development impact the missions. This chapter will demonstrate that specific types of UN peacekeeping missions have a significant positive impact on the probability of post-civil war states sustaining peace. However, these risk factors negate the effectiveness of traditional peacekeeping missions. Consequently, before authorizing the mission, policymakers should examine the situation to discern if these risk factors are present and execute a type of peacekeeping mission capable of mitigating these risks. By adjusting the level of resources and technical capability to the specific environment, multidimensional peacekeeping missions effectively assist states recovering from civil wars and secure lasting peace.

This chapter has six remaining sections: (1) a background on UN peacekeeping missions, (2) peacekeeping objectives, (3) findings from previous research, (4) the impact of peacekeeping, (5) analysis of risk factors, and (6) the conclusion.

C. BACKGROUND

The UN launched its first peacekeeping mission in 1948, when the Security Council authorized UN military observers to monitor the Armistice Agreement between Israel and its Arab neighbors. Since this first mission, the UN has undertaken 63 peacekeeping missions throughout the world and has rapidly escalated the number of

missions since the conclusion of the Cold War.[106] In 1988, six UN peacekeeping operations existed; however, the number of active operations jumped to 17 in 1993 and has never dropped below 15 as of 2008.[107] The Security Council mandated some forty-five peacekeeping missions from 1988 to 2004, compared with just thirteen from 1948 to 1987 (see Figure 3 for a graph of UN peacekeeping operations).[108]

Figure 3. UN peacekeeping operations and civil wars (From: *International Security*)[109]



In addition to an increased number of operations, the nature of conflicts has also changed over the past two decades. During the Cold War, peacekeepers were introduced in the aftermath of interstate conflicts after the involved states agreed to a cease-fire and provided consent for a UN mission. More recently, however, peacekeepers are inserted

[106] In many ways, the end of the end of the Cold War presented a transition point for peacekeeping operations. During the Cold War, the competition of ideologies between Western and Communist states led to fairly pronounced spheres of influence between the superpowers. Although international organizations such as the UN were created to provide collective security, peacekeeping operations were rarely authorized due to both the unwillingness of the superpowers to have an outside organization meddling within their sphere and the veto power held by the permanent members of the Security Council. However, the collapse of Communism led to the expectation of a revitalized UN capable of conducting collective security missions as originally intended in the UN Charter. This expectation led to a marked increase in the role of the United Nations in establishing peacekeeping operations to monitor cease-fires and participate in other duties through the 1990s. Department of Public Information, "United Nations Peacekeeping," http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/ (accessed November 20, 2008); Kenneth R. Dombroski, *Peacekeeping in the Middle East as an International Regime* (New York: Routledge, 2007), 7.

[107] Marjorie A. Browne, *United Nations Peacekeeping: Issues for Congress* (2008).

[108] Dombroski, *Peacekeeping in the Middle East as an International Regime*, 7.

[109] "Neotrusteeship and the Problem of Weak States," *International Security* 28, no. 4 (Spring 2004).

into intrastate conflicts while violence is still active and without the consent (and sometimes against the will) of warring factions.[110] In the Cold War era, the UN only deployed four peacekeeping missions (approximately 30 percent) to conflicts that included civil disputes.[111] However, beginning with the 1989 mission to Namibia (UNTAG), more than 90 percent of peace operations have involved civil conflict. Moreover, in a number of cases, the deployment was to states with exclusively internal violence.[112]

This dramatic change in the strategic context of peacekeeping missions has caused the UN to expand its operations from "traditional" missions that primarily involved military functions, to complex "multidimensional" missions that include the expertise needed to implement the diverse tasks contained in peace agreements.[113] Although the military remains the backbone of most peacekeeping operations, multidimensional peacekeeping operations comprise a broad range of complex activities and involve many more civilian functions.[114] Now, among other duties, military peacekeepers may seize weapons, clear land mines, train security personnel, and protect the delivery of humanitarian assistance. Peacekeeping operations also involve more civilian tasks such as repatriating refugees, rebuilding physical infrastructure,

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[110] Browne, *United Nations Peacekeeping: Issues for Congress*, ii.

[111] Between 1946 and 1988, the international community was generally not in the business of keeping peace between belligerents within states. The UN and others occasionally intervened in civil wars during this time period (in the Congo, Lebanon, and Cyprus), but these missions were intended to contain civil conflicts that might otherwise draw in the great powers and/or to assist decolonization, not necessarily to keep peace between civil war belligerents themselves. Virginia Page Fortna, "Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace After Civil War," *International Studies Quarterly* 48, no. 2 (June 2004), 270-271.

[112] Paul F. Diehl, "Paths to Peacebuilding.," eds. T. David Mason and James D. Meernik (New York: Routledge, 2006), 125.; Fortna, *Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace After Civil War*, 271.

[113] Observer missions are typically small in size and involve unarmed monitors. Traditional peacekeeping missions are somewhat larger and involve lightly armed military units (often in addition to observers). They are usually authorized to use force only in self-defense. Multidimensional peacekeeping missions supplement traditional peacekeeping forces with large civilian components to monitor elections, train or monitor police, monitor human rights, and sometimes temporarily to administer the country. All three of these types of mission are based on the consent of the parties and are authorized under Chapter VI of the UN Charter. Enforcement missions are authorized under Chapter VII, and do not necessarily require the consent of the belligerents. Their forces are generally better armed and larger, mandated to impose peace by force. Ibid., 271.

[114] Department of Public Information, *United Nations Peacekeeping.*

maintaining law and order, monitoring and training police, and civilian administration, election monitoring, and human rights monitoring.[115]

Mullenbach notes that these peacebuilding activities can be "categorized into five dimensions: economic, humanitarian, legal, military, and political." Each of these dimensions includes a set of specific external actor activities that have the "overall goal of meeting the 'basic needs' of society, preventing military hostilities, and facilitating the peaceful settlement of an intrastate dispute."[116] Mullenback and Fortna both summarize that the main intent behind third-party peacebuilding efforts is to help lay the foundation for a sustainable and stable peace.[117]

D. PEACEKEEPING OBJECTIVES

Doyle notes that civil wars occur when individuals, groups, and factions within a society decide that the security services, judiciary, or politicians no longer act on their behalf. The "local cop on the beat," becomes the "Croatian, Serb, or Muslim cop." When the "disaffected mobilize, acquire the resources needed to risk an armed contest, and judge that they can win, civil war follows."[118] Just as civil wars usually involve a failure of legitimate state authority, sustainable peace relies on its successful restoration. Accordingly, in *An Agenda for Peace*, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali developed the concept of "post-conflict peacebuilding," and defined it as "action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict."[119] Hence, peacekeeping missions aim to provide the

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[115] Browne, *United Nations Peacekeeping: Issues for Congress*, ii.

[116] Fortna, *Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace After Civil War*, 271; Mark J. Mullenbach, "Reconstructing Strife-Torn Societies" In *Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding in Post-War Societies*, eds. T. David Mason and James D. Meernik (New York: Routledge, 2006), 57.; Department of Public Information, *United Nations Peacekeeping.*

[117] Fortna, *Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace After Civil War*, 271; Mullenbach, *Reconstructing Strife-Torn Societies*, 57.

[118] Michael W. Doyle, "Strategy and Transitional Authority" In *Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements*, eds. Stephen J. Stedman, Donald Rothchild and Elizabeth M. Cousens (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), 71.

[119] Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking, and Peacekeeping, Report of the Secretary-General* (New York: United Nations, 1992), 4.

space and conduct actions that will allow the state to establish legitimate and functioning state institutions that act impartially on behalf of its citizens.

Thus, peacekeeping advocates contend that establishing peace requires addressing the factors that lead factions to mobilize towards violence. The most common issue is the "security dilemma" that arises between groups within the state. In the absence of a central state authority that can provide security, each faction attempts to secure arms for protection. However, as in an arms race between states, increased weaponry for one faction makes the other groups vulnerable to attack and in need of increased armaments.[120]

The theory implies that peacekeepers can step in as a neutral third party and break this cycle. By providing security and committing to enforce the terms of the peace agreement, peacekeepers remove the threat of attack by former adversaries and externally secure the terms of the agreement. With the incentives to maintain military capacity removed, factions can demobilize their combatants. Joanna Spear argues that it is the demobilization of combatants that fosters the security required to successfully implement a peace agreement. Lacking security on the ground, "there cannot be deep implementation of such an agreement; for example, the holding of elections, reempowerment of civil society, establishment of political accountability, and redevelopment of the economy."[121]

E. FINDINGS FROM PREVIOUS RESEARCH

However, do UN peacekeeping missions accomplish what is suggested in theory? Do UN intercessions chartered to help sustain the peace in post-civil war states help create a more stable peace? Different researchers on this topic have arrived to a number of conflicting conclusions. For example, on one spectrum Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild found third-party involvement was an important factor that substantially

[120] Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, *Making War & Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 28.

[121] Joanna Spear, "Disarmament and Demobilization" In *Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements*, eds. Stephen J. Stedman, Donald Rothchild and Elizabeth M. Cousens (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), 141.

increased the likelihood of a sustained peace.[122] In their 2000 study, Doyle and Sambanis offered the more restrained finding that "multilateral, United Nations peace operations make a positive difference."[123] Finally, on the opposite end of the spectrum, Amitabh Dubey's study using Doyle and Sambanis' dataset found that external peacekeeping missions do not increase the likelihood of achieving a sustained peace.[124]

F. THE IMPACT OF PEACEKEEPING

Each of the studies found that peacekeeping can reduce the likelihood of civil war. However, the researchers found different levels of effectiveness. Fortna found a significant influence from all types of peacekeeping missions, while Doyle, Sambanis, and Mullenbach found that multidimensional peacekeeping had the most significant impact on a state securing peace.

Fortna found a 32 percent reduction in the risk of renewed conflict for UN peacekeeping operations in the post-WWII period. Moreover, at the end of the Cold War the positive effect of peacekeeping on peace is more significant. She notes, "Across similar states, when the international community deploys peacekeepers the risk of another round of fighting drops by almost 70 percent." She found that UN peacekeeping missions had a smaller impact than missions led by other organizations, with a 50 percent reduction in the risk of renewed violence versus a 70 percent reduction. However, due to the limited number of cases, this finding falls short of the 10 percent statistical

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[122] The choice of case selection potentially drove the overwhelmingly positive results of this research. Hartzell's cases were limited to civil wars that ended in a negotiated settlement while the other studies looked at all cases of post-civil war peace that occurred from 1944-1996. Caroline A. Hartzell, Matthew Hoddie and Donald Rothchild, "Stabilizing the Peace After Civil War: An Investigation of some Key Variables," *International Organization* 55, no. 1 (Winter 2001), 183-208.

[123] In particular, they find strong evidence that multidimensional peacekeeping, "missions with extensive civilian functions, including economic reconstruction, institutional reform, and election oversight" significantly improve the chances of peacebuilding success (measured two years after the end of the war). Doyle, *Strategy and Transitional Authority*, 71-88.

[124] A variation in measuring the dependent variable was the primary factor that produced a difference in the results found by Doyle and Sambanis' versus those found by Dubey. Doyle and Sambanis considered peacekeeping successful if the peace was maintained for at least two years after the departure of peacekeepers, while Dubey considers a return to violence at any point after peacekeepers have left to be a failure.

significance threshold (p = .12).[125] Later, this chapter will discuss how the level of violence occurring in the state plays a role in the type of international intervention that will be effective.

Fortna's findings are important because they use the same stringent criteria for peacekeeping success that led Dubey to determine that peacekeeping did not have a significant impact on the sustainability of peace (see footnote 125). However, even with this more rigorous standard, she found that peacekeeping has a significant impact (especially post-Cold War) on the likelihood of achieving a sustained peace.

Doyle and Sambanis found that UN missions had a high significance, but the type of UN mission had a substantial impact on the mission's effectiveness. They found that traditional peacekeeping could help achieve sovereign peace but had a negative influence on securing a self-sustaining peace. Moreover, traditional peacekeeping was not effective in difficult environments. In permissive environments, they suggest that observer missions had a higher positive impact on both sovereign and participatory peace than traditional peacekeeping missions. Finally, they found that a multidimensional peacekeeping mission increases the probability of a state achieving sovereign peace by an average of 52 percent and participatory peace by an average of 36 percent.[126]

Mullenbach found that states with multidimensional peacekeeping missions were 26 percent less likely to escalate into military hostilities within five years of the post-civil war peace than states that did not receive a multidimensional peacekeeping mission (20 percent versus 46 percent, respectively).[127] Additionally, he found that 33 percent of post-conflict states that received multidimensional peacekeepers implemented the terms of the peace agreement within a five-year time span versus only 13 percent of the cases that did not. Mullenbach provides a final important observation when he notes that 40

[125] Fortna, *Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace After Civil War*, 282.

[126] Doyle and Sambanis, *Making War & Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations*, 111-118.

[127] Mullenbach, *Reconstructing Strife-Torn Societies*, 65.

percent of states with traditional peacekeeping missions returned to internal violence within five years compared to the 20 percent noted above for multidimensional peacekeeping missions.[128]

G. ANALYSIS OF RISK FACTORS

Although UN peacekeeping missions provide a positive influence on a state's ability to maintain the peace, additional data points lie within these general findings that demonstrate the impact of civil war risk factors on a specific mission's effectiveness. The introduction of risk factors helps explain why traditional peacekeeping missions have limited effectiveness. Additionally, the identification of specific factors can help peacebuilders implement the required force composition for multidimensional missions.

1. Ethnicity

The risk indicators suggest that ethnic conflicts indicate a more difficult environment for peace operations. The data supports this hypothesis and ethnically influenced conflicts are "highly significant and are negatively correlated" with peacebuilding success, and it has a more significant impact on participatory peace than on sovereign peace.[129] UN peacekeeping operations have the ability to address the low-level violence that occurs after a civil war to enable countries to rebuild institutions and democratize. However, they do not have the military capacity needed to end conflicts or prevent the resumption of full-scale civil war between the combatants.

This is a severe limitation because ethnically motivated conflicts contain many characteristics that can rapidly denigrate to full-scale war. First, ethnically based wars rarely solve the core injustices that initiated the conflict and violence often continues after the factions agree to peace. In addition, ethnically motivated passions can lead to rapidly escalating tensions. Moreover, ethnic lines create a natural channel to spread

[128] Mullenbach, *Reconstructing Strife-Torn Societies*, 65-67.

[129] Due to the difficulty in distinguishing civil wars that are truly ethno-religious in nature as opposed to revolutionary or some other type, Doyle and Sambanis use two different versions of the variable that they individually coded (*ethnic war 1* to capture recruiting practices by rebel groups and *ethnic war 2* includes government recruiting practices). They coded wars as ethnic if the majority of the parties recruit members and form alliances within religious or ethnic lines. Both versions produce results consistent to the hypothesis.

hostility and can be so intense that they mobilize the ethnic group to war. Further, the hardened identity of ethnicity and fairly easy identification creates additional tension that increases the difficulty of post-conflict reconciliation between factions that were previously adversaries.[130]

2. Conflict Intensity

The risk indicators would suggest a lower probability of peacekeeping success with increased conflict intensity. The findings support this theory; higher conflict intensities produced increased levels of postwar hostility. Consequently, "human misery created by the war is negatively and significantly associated with peacebuilding success."[131] However, the findings suggest that the number of total deaths by itself does not sufficiently impact peacekeeping success; instead, a combination of total deaths and displacements merge (per capita deaths and displacements) to substantially impact the volatility of the peacekeeping environment.

In this situation, the peace during the period immediately after a conflict is extremely tenuous.[132] The intense level of violence that occurred during the conflict creates an explosive combination of hatred and fear that destabilizes the post-conflict environment. As Stedman summarizes, "Far from being a time of conflict reduction," the period immediately after concluding the conflict is "fraught with risk, uncertainty, and vulnerability for the warring parties and civilians caught in between."[133] Consequently, peace intervention must happen quickly to have the best chance of success.

3. Shared Characteristics of Ethnicity and Conflict Intensity

One of the most important realizations is the difference in effectiveness between traditional and multidimensional peacekeeping missions in post-conflict states that were

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[130] Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, "International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis," *The American Political Science Review* 94, no. 4 (December 2000), 783, 786.

[131] Doyle and Sambanis, *Making War & Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations*, 98-99.

[132] Ibid., 793.

[133] Stephen J. Stedman, "Introduction" In *Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements,* eds. Stephen J. Stedman, Donald Rothchild and Elizabeth M. Cousens (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), 2.

exposed to ethnic or high-conflict intensity risk factors.[134] It is important to note that the UN has acted on this observation. After the peacekeeping failures in the 1990s, the organization assessed its peacekeeping assumptions, requirements, and operating procedures and made reforms to address many of the deficiencies it found. This transformation process is what led to the concept of multidimensional peacekeeping. Although more expensive in numbers of personnel and financial costs, the added capacity brought by multidimensional peacekeeping has shown to dramatically increase the UN's ability to rebuild a war torn society and reestablish the institutions needed for a sustained peace.

Nonetheless, while UN multidimensional peacekeeping missions are the most effective means for international intervention in a peacekeeping situation, UN led missions are not effective in stopping ongoing violence. The mere presence of a UN mission (regardless of the mandate type) does not have a significant short-term affect on whether the parties will resume conflict. Even for multidimensional peacekeeping, the mission's impact on preventing conflict recurrence increases over the longer term as the positive impacts of institutional reconstruction influence the factions' preference between war and peace. [135]

This gives credence to both Marten and Wilson's argument that stopping a conflict between determined combatants requires intervention by militarily capable "interested states that have the will and resources to see them through difficult times. Without that kind of strong state support, outside intervention is often no match for the spoilers.[136] Regional organizations and "coalitions" of the willing can both effectively

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[134] In gauging the post-conflict state, Kimberly Martin assesses that "The situations on the ground today are much more violent, and the involved parties are much harder to identify accurately, since paramilitary or gang forces are involved in many of today's conflicts and can blend back into the social environments that spawned them. Ceasefires mean little when state leaders lack control over potential spoilers or can at least claim to lack control when it suits their political ends."Kimberly Marten, "Is Stability the Answer?" In *Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World*, eds. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson and Pamela Aall (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2008), 621-622.

[135] Doyle and Sambanis, *Making War & Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations*, 110, 118.

[136] Kimberly Marten, "Is Stability the Answer?" In *Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World*, eds. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson and Pamela Aall (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2008), 621-622.

conduct peace enforcement missions, as both can have more military capability than the UN. When authorizing a course of action the international community should weigh the benefits of increased military capacity versus the illegitimacy that occurs when the intervening force is dominated by a single powerful state. However; the overriding determinant of success comes down to a militarily powerful state that has vital interests at stake leading the operation.[137]

4. Economic Development

Two different theories are addressed within economic development. The first is that an initially high level of economic development should indicate a higher probability of peacekeeping success. More developed economies with established infrastructure and lower levels of poverty should have a higher capacity for rebuilding after civil war and be less susceptible to war recurrence due to lack of economic opportunity. However, analysis of the data does not support this theory; a high level of economic development does not reduce the risk of renewed conflict. Peacekeeping forces should not assume that the presence of economic capacity will translate to a content population (indeed, if this was the case the state would not have instigated the civil war to start). A state can have a high level of economic development and still have economic inequality, repressive governmental institutions, and ethnic fractionalization.

The second theory is that after a civil war, economic growth can help mitigate war-generated hostility, as a growing economy addresses previously existing economic grievances and offers incentives for people to avoid another war. In contrast to the level of economic development, economic growth has an important effect on short-term mitigation of civil war risks. The data suggests that rapid economic growth can compensate for a weak peacekeeping force and reduces the risk of conflict recurrence in the period immediately following a conflict. Additionally, the data suggests that this impact is most effective when the economic growth occurs locally. Thus, even a thinly

[137] Gary Wilson, "UN Authorized Enforcement: Regional Organizations Versus 'Coalitions of the Willing'," *International Peacekeeping (13533312)* 10, no. 2 (2003), 101.

dispersed peacekeeping force that has the ability to sponsor small-scale economic growth projects that develop local capacities are "crucial predictors" of achieving stability.[138]

The presence of valuable natural resources can compound the difficulty of a peacekeeping mission. If natural resources are located in only a portion of the state, competing views over the control and the distribution of the profits from those resources create a minefield of issues that can escalate into confrontation. Human societies almost universally attach locality as a part of an individual's identify. This tendency can become more pronounced during civil wars as identities become hardened as a means to identify individuals as potential friends or adversaries. The division of society along factional lines means that specific factions will control previously discovered resources. Moreover, if new resources are discovered, a defined group is likely to exclusively control the territory where they are located.[139]

Consequently, rebel leaders emphasize and often exaggerate the potential gains from capturing control over the resources to mobilize popular support for secession based on identity claims. For example, Collier et al. notes that "all ethnically differentiated societies have a few ethnic romantics who dream of creating an ethnically 'pure' political entity;" however, the discovery of resources has the potential to "shift such movements from the margin of romanticism to the core agenda of economic self-interest."[140] If not addressed, the secessionist rhetoric can undermine the peacekeeper's efforts to de-escalate tensions and stabilize the state.

A second way that commodities can challenge the peacekeeping mission is through the direct funding of rebel forces. However, this not only occurs with established rebel groups that already control resources, but may also happen when small rebel forces raise finances by selling the future rights to war booty. For example, in the Congo

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[138] Doyle and Sambanis, *Making War & Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations*, 103-104.

[139] Michael L. Ross, "How Do Natural Resources Influence Civil War? Evidence from Thirteen Cases," *International Organization* 58, no. 1 (Winter 2004), 35-67; Ross, *What do we Know about Natural Resources and Civil War?* 337-356.

[140] Collier et al., *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy*, 60.

private militias raised 150 million dollars by selling future exploitation rights to oil reserves; funds that were critical in building a military force capable of initiating the 1997 civil war.[141]

H. PEACEKEEPING CONCLUSION

Ultimately, it is up to the parties involved in the civil war to make the decisions and commitments necessary to bring peace to war-torn societies, but UN peacekeeping missions play an instrumental role in helping a willing society overcome the obstacles that can prevent their state from establishing peace. The security provided by peacekeepers creates an environment that permits the other elements of domestic society and the international community to conduct the actions needed to stabilize the state.

However, in the presence of militant leaders who have not abandoned violence, the introduction of peacekeepers alone is not sufficient to guarantee security. This creates a significant vulnerability for peacekeeping missions, as entrenched militant leaders can use ethnic identity or the hatred brought by massive displacement to rekindle the motivations for war. This weakness was powerfully demonstrated by the failure of traditional peacekeeping missions. They emphasized impartiality and observation, and consequently did not have the means or the mandate to confront actors that threatened the peace process.

The international community has acted on previous shortfalls, and today's multidimensional peacekeeping missions actively attempt to implement a new power structure within the post-civil war state. Since this threatens former powerbrokers within the state that have traditionally held power by force, peacekeeping missions must have the capacity to establish enough of a presence to suppress militant leaders that are challenging the international community.

Accordingly, it is also important to acknowledge the means by which militant leaders can destabilize the peacekeeping process. Rebel control of natural resources should provide policymakers an acute warning of probable militant resistance to the

[141] Ross, "What Do We Know about Natural Resources and Civil War?", 337-356.

peacekeeping mission. First, natural resources or the prospect of future wealth provides warlords with the means to finance military operations. Additionally, natural resources create a patronage network where specific factions control and distribute the proceeds gained from the resources. Both of these situations create numerous challenges to the peacekeeping mission.

These limitations necessitate that peacekeeping missions expand their influence in more areas than just security. Although a gap exists in the UN's ability to influence the likelihood of peace in the period immediately following the end of the conflict, these findings suggest that multidimensional peacekeeping missions can provide one of the most effective means to bring progress across multiple fronts and help secure a lasting peace to post-civil war states. Further capacity that disrupts the ability of hostile actors to act as spoilers would be the next step in increasing their effectiveness.

V. ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO POST-CIVIL WAR STATES

A. INTRODUCTION

With few exceptions, conflict-ridden countries are among the least developed. Since 1990, "80 percent of the world's 20 poorest countries have suffered a major armed conflict."[142] Additionally, of the "39 states that are currently considered to be conflict-affected, 30 are among the world's poorest."[143] In the often cited Collier and Hoeffler economic model of civil war, the authors argue that it is not "political and social grievances per se that leads to civil war, but rather, for given levels of grievance, it is the opportunity to organize and finance a rebellion that determines if a civil war will occur or not."[144] According to this model, the determinants of an escalation to violence are primarily economic, and there are specific conditions that make rebellion financially viable.

In view of this, it is not surprising that economic development provides one of the most powerful indicators of whether a post-civil war state will return to violence or sustain the peace. However, many post-civil war states are locked in a vicious circle where poverty causes conflict and conflict causes poverty. Low-income countries have severe institutional and capacity problems. Basic infrastructure such as schools, homes, industry, communications networks, and transportation infrastructure has been destroyed. The currency is often devalued. Institutions are weak and corrupt with dysfunctional legal, governmental, and financial structures that hinder the recovery efforts.[145] All these

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[142] The World Bank, *Post-Conflict Fund and LICUS Trust Fund Annual Report* (2006).

[143] Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, *MIGA in Conflict-Affected Countries* (World Bank Group, 2003).

[144] Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis, eds., *Understanding Civil War: Evidence and Analysis*, Vol. 1 (Washington DC: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, 2005), XIII.

[145] Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, *MIGA in Conflict-Affected Countries*, 5.

infrastructural and institutional weaknesses hamper economic growth, and, consequently, invite internal strife. Yet, in turn, civil wars are the "main obstacle to development and poverty reduction in many countries."[146]

The international community has recognized the importance of economic development in securing the peace, and the World Bank alone distributes over 20 billion dollars in economic aid to post-conflict states. However, post-conflict reconstruction aid is a unique form of developmental assistance that entails specific challenges due to its two objectives: (1) meeting immediate needs that typically include humanitarian assistance and other forms of relief assistance; and (2) rebuilding the physical and institutional infrastructure required to support long-term economic development. Martin Weiss notes that while the "goals of relief and development are not inherently incompatible, effectively distributing resources that balance these short and long-term goals is potentially the most difficult challenge for post-conflict aid."[147]

These competing goals can lead to incongruent policies that not only undermine the efforts of the other, but that are removed from the objectives of the peace process and can destabilize the targeted state. In order to help understand how economic issues correlate to civil war violence, this chapter has five following sections that explore (1) the relationship between economic development and civil war onset, (2) traditional development strategies, (3) problems in the traditional approaches, (4) the impact of risk factors, and (5) conclusion.

B. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND CIVIL WAR ONSET

1. Research Findings

After compiling civil war risk indicators, the author found that every study that included economic development as a variable unanimously found a significant relationship that indicates increased economic development is associated with a decreased likelihood of civil war. Of note from these studies, in their 1997 research

[146] The World Bank, *Post-Conflict Fund and LICUS Trust Fund Annual Report*, 1.

[147] Martin A. Weiss, *World Bank Post-Conflict Aid: Oversight Issues for Congress* (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 2004).

Collier & Hoeffler found a significant negative relationship between development, measured as per capita income, and the probability of civil wars. Collier et al. continued to develop this in their 2005 study where they note that increasing per capita income is highly significant in reducing the likelihood of renewed civil war.[148] Additionally, Henderson and Singer found that the conflict-dampening impact of development, which may be barely evident in all states, is markedly evident in post-colonial states.[149] Their finding is corroborated by Auvinen, whose results from a logit regression using the Correlates of War (COW) civil war database indicate a significant negative relationship between economic development and the likelihood of civil war for the 70 less-developed countries in his study.[150] Auvinen also noted that post-civil war states often turn to international organizations for assistance in economic development and stabilization. However, his analysis implicated that the International Monetary Fund's conditionality structural-adjustment programs generated so much political instability that the programs often created worse political and economic conditions within the state after their implementation than what was experienced without them.[151]

In a more comprehensive 2008 study, Collier, Hoefler, and Soderbom reconfirm their earlier findings: "Income matters: it is highly significant and the effect is large." Their study found if the economy remains stagnant through the decade following a civil war, the state has a 42 percent mean risk of renewed violence. However, their research found that if the initial level of income is twice the mean and all other characteristics are held constant, then the risk falls to 31 percent. Additionally, they found that if the state's economy grows at 10 percent per year the risk falls to 27 percent.[152]

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[148] Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler and Nicholas Sambanis, "The Collier-Hoeffler Model of Civil War Onset and the Case Study Project Research Design" In *Understanding Civil War: Evidence and Analysis*, eds. Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis, Vol. 1 (Washington DC: The World Bank, 2005), 9.

[149] Errol A. Henderson and J. David Singer, "Civil War in the Post-Colonial World, 1946-92," *Journal of Peace Research* 37, no. 3 (May 2000), 290.

[150] Juha Auvinen, "Political Conflict in Less Developed Countries 1981-89," *Journal of Peace Research* 34, no. 177 (1997), 193.

[151] E. Wayne Nafziger and Juha Auvinen, "Economic Development, Inequality, War, and State Violence," *World Development* 30, no. 2 (2002), 157.

[152] Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler and Mans Soderbom, "Post-Conflict Risks," *Journal of Peace Research* 45, no. 4 (July 2008), 469.

2. Research Analysis

These findings have three important implications. First, the risks are considerably higher in low-income countries: the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, and East Timor are all much more alarming situations than Bosnia, other things being equal. Second, economic performance during the first decade after conflict is likely to matter, if only because higher income will bring risks down. Finally, Auvinen's findings suggest that high risk states require a multi-faceted approach that couples the macro focus of the IMF's structural adjustment programs with micro level developmental programs that foster political stability. The failure to adopt a comprehensive approach can lead to policies where the actions taken to alleviate problems related to one class of factors (i.e., economic solvency) exacerbate difficulties related to other factors (i.e., political stability).

Hegre & Sambanis provide an example of these inter-relationships when they explain that wealthier countries have more resources at their disposition that could be invested in social insurance and other forms of redistribution with the aim to alleviate social tensions.[153] Additionally, Collier & Hoeffler note that highly developed countries have a much broader tax base than developing economies, which contributes to increased state capacity to address factors that could lead to civil war (i.e., the ability to provide a social safety net to underprivileged minorities and increased coercive capacity to counter violent opposition to the government).[154] However, if Auvinen's conclusions are correct, the failure of the international community to consider these inter-relationships has contributed to the suffering of the post-civil war state's population, which in turn has spawned domestic conflict during a period when a newly established government has limited capacity and is highly vulnerable to collapse.

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[153] Havard Hegre and Nicholas Sambanis, "Sensitivity Analysis of Empirical Results on Civil War Onset," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50, no. 4 (August 2006), 508.

[154] Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance in Civil War," *Oxford Economic Papers* 56, no. 4 (2004), 563-595.

C. TRADITIONAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES

1. Background

Until the second half of the 1990s, donors responded to the economic needs of post-civil war states with long-established programmatic approaches developed for other circumstances. The tasks were divided into two categories: relief and development. Humanitarian organizations or emergency response divisions of development agencies provided relief, while bilateral and multilateral development agencies focused on development. These two aid strategies are based on different economic models: the natural disaster model for crisis relief, and the post-war stabilization and reconstruction model for development.[155]

2. The Natural Disaster Model

The natural disaster model provides the conceptual framework for most post-civil war assistance in the first two years, as it does for most humanitarian assistance and emergency relief during wartime. The focus of this model is on meeting the populations' basic needs by the fastest means possible, which typically entails the direct delivery of goods and services. Due to the immediate severity of the populations' critical needs, longer-term development programming is considered a second stage activity. [156]

Thus, although relief organizations are equipped to respond rapidly and are often directly knowledgeable about the local conditions and the immediate needs of the population, humanitarian workers nonetheless have a short-term approach. Unfortunately, once the aid agencies gain a vested interest in the program's continuation, they often continue to use this approach beyond the initial crisis response.[157] This tendency has become a reoccurring problem cited numerously by World Bank officials

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[155] Susan L. Woodward, "Economic Priorities for Successful Peace Implementation" In *Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements*, eds. Stephen J. Stedman, Donald Rothchild and Elizabeth M. Cousens (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), 189.

[156] Tracy Gerstle and Timothy Nourse, "Market Development during and Post-Conflict: Emerging Lessons for Pro-Poor Economic Reconstruction" (2006).

[157] Woodward, *Economic Priorities for Successful Peace Implementation*, 190.

with Sven Sandstrom, the World Bank's managing director, stating that "in the transition from relief to development, too much time has been spent in the relief phase."[158]

3. The Post-War Stabilization and Reconstruction Model

The post-war stabilization and reconstruction model is a neoliberal economic strategy emanating from the international financial institutions (IFIs), particularly from the World Bank and IMF. The World Bank's Articles of agreement include the specified purposes of "the restoration of economies destroyed or disrupted by war" and the "reconversion of productive facilities to peacetime needs."[159] The IMF focuses on producing macroeconomic conditions that will increase foreign investors' confidence in a country's economic prospects.[160]

The IFIs use a two-pronged strategy of macroeconomic stabilization and structural adjustment. The process begins with an IMF program that provides credit to the country's special drawing rights account at the IMF. However, this credit is conditional and offered to support the completion of stabilization measures based on the orthodox deflationary principles of monetary and fiscal restraint. The IMF phase is followed by sovereign loans mobilized from donors by the World Bank for projects designed to promote macroeconomic growth and attract foreign investment. Typically, these funds are designated to support Bank designated large-scale physical infrastructure construction projects, to reform economic institutions, and to institute policies that promote liberalization and privatization.[161]

The IMF traditionally places priority on macroeconomic stability, both as the first task of economic policy and as the context from which all other aid and policy takes place. Consequently, the inflexibility of its stabilization model has been frequently criticized as being in conflict with the goals of social peace and reconciliation.[162]

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[158] Sven Sandstrom, "Public Sector Finance in Post-Conflict Situations" (August 1999).

[159] Jonathan Stevenson, *Preventing Conflict: The Role of the Bretton Woods Institutions* (New York: Routledge, 2005), 51.

[160] Woodward, *Economic Priorities for Successful Peace Implementation*, 191.

[161] Ibid., 191.

[162] Ibid., 191.

Moreover, experiences during the growing number of humanitarian aid and peacekeeping missions that occurred during the 1990s led to the recognition that a gap exists between the assistance provided through the natural disaster model and the postwar stabilization and reconstruction model.

D. PROBLEMS IN THE TRADITIONAL APPROACHES

1. Limitations of the Natural Disaster Model

Sustained relief activity in the form of donations and support for unviable livelihood activities can intensify the negative economic impact that occurs due to civil war. These interventions, while critical to meeting short-term human needs, distort the private economic sector. Eliminating relief delivery distortions is impossible; however, by not accounting for the impact on the local market many relief programs exacerbate the problem. In their 2006 study on relief programs, Tracy Gerstle and Timothy Nourse found multiple conditions that foster this neglect, to include:

1. The practical difficulties of identifying legitimate businesses and entrepreneurs and designing programs that utilize them effectively in a chaotic and pressured situation.
2. Relief programs' inherent nature and their objective to address conflict-affected populations' immediate needs. This focus on a conflict's symptoms rather than causes, and the need for expediency, creates an "emergency mindset," impeding in-depth analysis.
3. A lack of understanding of the private sector and distrust of "profiteers" by many relief agency staff, re-enforced by some actors' exploitative business practices in many relief environments.
4. Short-term, inflexible funding cycles, combined with the requirement to impact large numbers of people quickly, favors direct delivery of goods or services over the "indirect" use of local institutions and market channels, which often are weakened by the conflict.[163]

When outside relief agencies overlook local markets, the targeted populations' immediate needs are still often met. However, there may be significant unintended consequences, such as the following:

[163] Gerstle and Nourse, *Market Development during and Post-Conflict: Emerging Lessons for Pro-Poor Economic Reconstruction*, 11-12.

Unsustainable impact: Since the improved livelihoods are not based on viable market assumptions (such as appropriateness of technology, incentives, availability of inputs, and sufficient demand) impacts may be temporary or allow the exploitation of vulnerable household industries and small enterprises.

Adverse impact on unaffected households: Relief donations that provide free primary goods often compete with the lower prices of commodities produced locally. The lower prices can mean that the local producer of that good can no longer survive from the income produced from developing the product. Thus, relief donations can spread the economic hardship to previously healthy segments of the local economy. For example, in Ethiopia aid organizations imported grain from outside of the country, in spite of grain surpluses within other regions of Ethiopia. The introduction of free imported grains depressed prices, which reduced farmers' incomes in food surplus areas and caused poverty to spread from the drought-affected areas to areas that were previously performing well economically.[164]

Development of a "relief" or "dependency" culture: The delivery of supplies results in relief organizations developing internal capacity and host-population expectations that are only focused on the continued delivery of goods, a condition which is difficult to redirect towards development at a later date. The American Refugee Committee (ARC), acting as the technical lead in an international NGO consortium conducting a value chain program in rural Sierra Leone, found that the entire system needed to be completely overhauled. To successfully implement a program that built local capacity and removed the reliance on subsidies, the ARC stated that both the community members and the relief agency staff needed to be "de-programmed" from a relief mentality.[165]

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[164] Addis Ababa, "Local and Regional Food Procurement-an Analytical Review (Ethiopian Case Study)," *Agridev Consulting* (June 2005).

[165] Timothy Nourse, *Microfinance Sector Development in West Africa* (Washington D.C.: USAID, 2006).

2. Challenges of the Post-War Stabilization and Reconstruction Model

Although there is coherent logic to the post-war stabilization and reconstruction model and the strategies based on it, the model makes assumptions and ignores variables that cause a series of practical problems when applied to contemporary post-conflict settings. The successful postcolonial transitions and the developmental failures in Africa provide additional evidence of the limitations of this model. Appropriately, its potential effectiveness in post-civil war states, where the goal must include achieving economic stability without losing the peace, is even more questionable.

Model applicability: First, the success of the model in post-World War II Europe occurred under dramatically different conditions than the current cases of peace implementation. Post-World War II Western Europe faced the tasks of physical reconstruction and demobilization after an interstate war, with states that were victors and whose governmental and economic institutions were intact. They did not have the additional considerations of state building, the integration of former enemies into one army and one society, overcoming underdevelopment, and the implementation of peace agreement conditions. Moreover, the characteristics of a war economy in an industrialized state vary considerably from the war economies created by civil war in a developing country. The obstacles to foreign investment in post-war Western Europe did not include the high level of uncertainty surrounding the prospects for peace and the absence of a capacity to enforce contracts, property rights, and the repatriation of profits. Further, while some countries had the risk of social revolution, they did not risk United States withdrawal.[166]

Consequences of Macroeconomic Restraint: IFI policies of macroeconomic restraint prevent the public expenditures that are essential to peace, such as building a new competent civil administration, financing demobilization of combatants, and providing social infrastructure such as healthcare, vocational training, and schools. In this area, the IMF and World Bank have clashed over their loan criteria, as experienced in the proposals for Mozambique, Nicarauga, and Macedonia. However, the World Bank

[166] Mats R. Berdal and David M. Malone, *Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2000).

tends to back down and defer to IMF targets on budget deficits despite their negative political effects. For example, in its 1998 evaluation the Bank assessed that "the Cambodia case study finds that the Bank has continued to push for downsizing the civil services when the political coalition arrangement under the peace accords was based in part on raising the size of the civil service to absorb large numbers of the incoming parties' functionaries. The Bank's position was not politically realistic from the outset."[167]

Immediate hardships: Immediately after implementation, traditional stabilization policies also tend to increase unemployment and exacerbate economic inequalities, when achieving the reverse is essential. In addition, tight monetary policy inhibits accessible credit for the promotion of local small and medium enterprises (SMEs), even though the World Bank has acknowledged their critical importance in post-civil war development. Finally, rapid privatization and the promotion of agricultural exports can work directly counter to the politically crucial task of land reform and poverty reduction.[168]

E. IMPACT OF RISK FACTORS

1. Ethnic Factors

The delivery of material aid in a manner that benefits a single ethnic faction can have a significant destabilizing effect within the state. In a post-conflict society, "aid resources represent economic wealth and political power." As a consequence, control of aid resources becomes a powerful tool that enables leaders to exert control over the population. Moreover, external aid can equate to military strength when it fulfills a faction's need for shelter, food, and health services to such an extent that the local

[167] Alcira Kreimer et al., *The World Bank's Experience with Post-Conflict Reconstruction* (Washington D.C.: The World Bank, 1998), xvi.

[168] Woodward, *Economic Priorities for Successful Peace Implementation*, 193.

resources are freed up for military use. In addition, militant groups can steal aid resources for either domestic use to support their armies or to resell to purchase weapons.[169]

However, aid agencies often cannot or do not take the steps required to control the distribution of their resources in a manner that does not support ethnic warlords. Aid agencies often do not speak the local language and must depend on local translators to distribute goods. However, the ability to speak a foreign language and translate is demonstrative of educational access, an indicator of past privilege that was often based off of ethnic preferences. Thus, aid becomes targeted to the translator's ethnic group, which reinforces and worsens group dividers. Additionally, ethnic warlords often control territory and coerce aid agencies to comply with the rules and restrictions they impose over their area of control. They may "tax aid goods, impose duties, establish currency exchanges rates, and restrict delivery sites and schedules."[170] This provides the militant leaders with income to finance the conflict, the ability to use aid delivery sites as a means to control where people do or do not live, and the affluence required to control the population's loyalty. Further, when aid agencies must receive permission from a warlord to gain access to the population that they intend to reach, the aid agency reinforces the legitimacy and power of the armed faction.

2. Conflict Intensity

Aid agencies have traditionally focused solely on their primary task of the delivery of relief goods or implementation of their economic development program, and have not sought to establish a domestic conflict management system. However, civil wars that have high conflict intensity are also typically characterized by extensive population displacement and with that dispute over issues such as property rights. The failure of relief and development agencies to implement aid programs in this situation without engaging in conflict resolution has aggravated conflicts. For example, providing

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[169] Mary B. Anderson, "Enhancing Local Capacity for Peace: Do No Harm" In *Peacebuilding: A Field Guide*, eds. Luc Reychler and Thania Paffenholz (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001), 259-261.

[170] Ibid., 260-261.

aid to farmers occupying disputed lands exacerbates tensions and gives the appearance that the aid agency is legitimating the current occupancy, placing the aid agency on a side of the conflict. Likewise, endemic problems such as cattle rustling are as much concerned with successful conflict management and resolution, as the development of husbandry skills. The failure to develop locally based institutions that can resolve competing claims before distributing inputs has limited the effectiveness of the aid programs and at times contributed to the breakdown of the peace process.[171]

3. Resource Dependency

The likelihood of renewed conflict is significantly higher in highly resource-dependent states. Collier notes that although the effect from primary commodity exports is non-linear, "the risk of conflict peaks when they constitute around 32 percent of GDP."[172] The fact that their economies are less diversified generally indicates that these states have lower levels of economic capacity. In an environment with high degrees of poverty, the potential wealth from the natural resources may "create predatory incentives that can lead to violence, or it can make it easier for rebel groups to finance a resumption of violence" if they gain control over lootable resources.[173] Moreover, oil-rich countries usually have underdeveloped state institutions that allow rampant corruption and that cannot effectively rebuild their polities after internal conflict.[174] Finally, natural resource dependence typically indicates an undiversified economy that is more vulnerable to commodity price shocks, has a limited ability to develop a manufacturing sector, and does not provide services that facilitate economic growth or develop human capital.[175]

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[171] John Prendergast and Emily Plumb, "Building Local Capacity: From Implementation to Peacebuilding" In *Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements*, eds. Stephen J. Stedman, Donald Rothchild and Elizabeth M. Cousens (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), 333.

[172] Collier, Hoeffler and Sambanis, *The Collier-Hoeffler Model of Civil War Onset and the Case Study Project Research Design*, 6, 9.

[173] Examples of the use of mineral riches as both a motive and a means to support rebellion are the civil wars in Angola, Sierra Leone, and Liberia, where the rebels have financed their activities by diamond looting and the wars themselves could have been loot driven. Michael L. Ross, "What Do We Know about Natural Resources and Civil War?" *Journal of Peace Research* 41, no. 3 (May 2004), 337-356.

[174] Michael L. Ross, "Does Oil Hinder Democracy?" *World Politics* 53, no. 3 (2001), 325-361.

[175] Doyle and Sambanis, *Making War & Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations*, 107.

International financial institutions have traditionally prioritized large-scale infrastructure projects that develop the natural resource sector as a means for the state to finance future development. However, as the limitations above discuss, the development of extraction capacity does not automatically translate into economic development throughout the diverse segments of the post-conflict state. IFIs must ensure that they do not limit their focus to a sole sector of the economy, especially when the development of that sector would only benefit a single faction and fuel a sense of injustice through the remainder of the population.

F. ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE CONCLUSION

Civil war devastates a country, leaving its destructive mark on physical structures, governmental institutions, legal systems, and almost every facet of a state's economic, political, and social fabric. For economic assistance to be effective, it requires a careful and concerted approach that leverages domestic resources, international donor assistance, and private sector resources. However, even in states not influenced by ethnic tensions, conflict intensity, and grievances induced by the level of economic development, the traditional approaches to delivering assistance have structural shortfalls that limit their effectiveness. At a minimum, these agencies should establish a more holistic approach to assistance that attempts to account for and mitigate the harmful consequences that have consistently occurred due to the narrow focus of their specific program.

The destabilizing impacts become even more pronounced in the presence of post-conflict risk factors. First, the limitations manifest within the agencies' methods of delivering aid mean that aid is not distributed to diverse segments of the population, but is instead primarily delivered to a specific faction. The ability of a particular faction to control aid resources reinforces the divisions and resentment that divided the factions during the conflict. Second, the aid agencies' dependency on regional warlords provides funding, power, and legitimacy to militant leaders. Finally, international development programs focused on the extraction of resources fosters corruption and patronage in the absence of strong state institutions.

Both relief and developmental agencies must remain mindful that conflict is the primary threat to the humanitarian and economic development objectives they wish to achieve. Consequently, these agencies must ensure that their policies do not undermine the peace process. To be effective, aid agencies must prioritize delivering aid in a manner where policies or assistance that benefits one segment of the population does not needlessly devastate other segments of the population. Additionally, aid agencies need to strengthen their commitment to increasing local capacity. Accordingly, they should build their programs from a foundation that prioritizes the use of the local population and development of local institutions.

VI. CONCLUSION

A. OVERVIEW

Even after their resolution, civil wars leave a horrible legacy for the post-conflict state. The scars from violence limit the state's ability to recover from the conflict and strengthen the influence of the militant leaders within the society. Moreover, researchers have identified specific factors that impact the probability of renewed violence — among these, ethnic violence, conflict intensity, and economic development significantly increase the likelihood of civil war renewal. At the same time, the international community has executed democratization programs, peacekeeping missions, and economic assistance as their primary strategies to stabilize post-conflict states. However, international efforts have not always accounted for the destabilizing influences that occur when risk variables interact with international action.

This thesis identifies four items as reoccurring impediments that have contributed to the collapse of the post-conflict peace: (1) the reinforcement of factional divisions produced during the conflict, (2) the empowerment of extremist/militant leaders, (3) the funding of militant groups, (4) and the distribution of wealth through patronage or along factional lines. Tragically, when policymakers have not accounted for the spillover effects that will occur due to the risk variables, international actions have actually exacerbated tensions and contributed to the renewal of violence. Thus, the thesis concludes with recommendations across each course of action to help account for these risk variables.

B. RECOMMENDATIONS

These recommendations identify the peacekeeping and economic assistance pillars as the primary areas that can help stabilize the peace immediately following the resolution of a conflict. Providing security is the first requirement to sustaining post-civil war peace. In addition, immediately after security is established, the rapid delivery of economic assistance is critical to the success of the peacekeeping mission. However, the author views democratization as a destabilizing force immediately following an internal

conflict. Instead, the priority for governance should be the development of institutions and local governance capacity — two actions that support the immediate goal of sustaining the peace and lay the groundwork for the long-term goal of democratic governance.

The following recommendations are designed to mitigate the spillover effects that currently occur in the execution of international action. The broad goals that underlie these recommendations include: (1) fostering the population's support for the peace process, (2) undermining the power of warlords and increasing the influence of leaders who advocate peace, (3) disrupting the sources of militant financing, and (4) encouraging projects that force collaboration and spread benefits across factional lines.

C. PEACEKEEPING PRIORITIES

1. Establish Immediate Influence with the Local Population

Despite the progress that the UN has made in revamping its peacekeeping capabilities, it still needs to improve its response to the challenges that threaten peace immediately following the resolution of the conflict. To improve in this area, peacekeeping missions must establish a stronger initial security presence that reaches the local population. The peacekeepers must establish themselves as a legitimate military presence that reduces the population's need to turn to warlords for security. Military capacity and presence are essential for disrupting the militant's hold over the population and creating space for moderate leaders to regain influence.

Additionally, peacekeeping missions must place more emphasis on providing peace dividends to the population immediately after establishing a mission in the country. Mission commanders need to look for quick wins they can achieve in order to gain the initial support of the population and give them the confidence that life will offer more in peace than in war. Actions such as providing security, distributing food, cleaning rubble, and offering medical clinics are often overlooked by individuals focused on major reforms such as establishing government institutions. These small tasks provide peacekeepers with credibility from the individuals on the ground — an essential part of undermining indigenous leaders in the population who are hostile to the peace process

and are attempting to turn the population against the peacekeepers and their objectives. Additionally, these initial successes provide the peacekeeping mission with the support and time needed to make the more extensive institutional changes that, while they must occur to establish a functioning state, take longer periods of time before they bring a positive impact to the population.

Finally, peacekeeping commanders must develop a problem resolution and reconciliation strategy that they will use to address the grievances that exist between adversarial factions within the population. This strategy should include the consent and participation of local leaders that reflect the diverse interest of the local population. To find the local leaders, peacekeepers should seek traditional leaders that have had their power usurped by militants. These leaders are usually seen as the legitimate authorities within the population and also have an incentive to work with the peacekeeping forces. In addition, the peacekeepers should get inputs and feedback from diverse segments of the society on qualified local leaders. The underlying objectives are to establish a conflict resolution process that holds legitimacy with the local population and to empower local leaders that are committed to peace and will see the process succeed.

2. Integration of Peacekeeping and Financial Resources

Economic growth is critical in supporting incentives for peace and helps achieve war avoidance even in the absence of an extensive international commitment. However, IFIs currently focus on large developmental projects that have their potential positive impacts negated by the factional divisions and weak governance capacity that characterize post-conflict states. Moreover, in Central American peacekeeping missions during the 1990s, the lack of coordination between economic policy-making institutions with the UN "prevented any discussion of the way budget cuts and trade liberalization…might affect the poor and peacebuilding in the fragile conditions of a war-torn society."[176] On the other end of the spectrum, relief agencies typically do not have a

[176] Jenny Pearce, "Peacebuilding and the Periphery: Lessons from Central America," *Third World Quarterly* 20, no. 1 (February 1999), 57.

strategy in place to transition from the delivery of direct aid to economic development. Furthermore, they do not have the ability to deliver aid without negotiating with, and thus empowering, warlords.

These limitations point to the need to transfer the control of economic development initiatives that will actually occur within the post-civil war state to the control of the peacekeeping mission. As part of the peacekeeping mission's mandate, the UN needs to empower the missions with the resources needed to start grassroots economic growth. Ideas for doing this may include providing the UN mission commanders with an equivalent of the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds that have proven effective in the United States stabilization efforts in Iraq. Another option could be the establishment of provisional reconstruction teams that include representatives from the local community, the peacekeeping force, and from aid agencies such as the World Bank. The ability of peacekeepers to rapidly spur economic development has proven to have a substantial impact in securing the peace. Accordingly, in addition to addressing the security dilemma that occurs after a conflict, the most successful peacekeeping missions have also established a peace dividend by providing immediate incentives to former combatants that made it more beneficial to remain at peace than to return to conflict.[177]

3. Building Local Capacities for Peace

After establishing an immediate presence, peacekeeping missions in conjunction with developmental agencies should make the expansion of local capacities for peace a focus of their strategies. A method to accomplish this is hiring individuals from all sides of the conflict for job training programs and then providing a safe place to conduct the program. The program should provide a strong focus on reconciliation, and enlist the support of community advocates who can resolve issues discussed during the reconciliation process. Methods to do this could include providing a common area where individuals from different factions can meet with the support of peace facilitators, and engaging with local leaders who want to support the peace process.

[177] Doyle and Sambanis, *Making War & Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations*, 132.

The leaders of the militant factions will discourage activities designed to alleviate tensions. However, strengthening cross-line communications can undercut the militant leaders by providing a forum that supports the elements within neighboring communities that need peaceful cooperation to accomplish mutual interest. Even the partial restoration of communication networks and cooperation can allow neighbors to graze animals, trade, and maintain other ties even while the factions' leaders seek to reignite violence. These actions present the population with tangible benefits that can come from conflict resolution and cooperation, rather than leaving the concept of peace as an abstraction that gets drowned out by the accusations and hostile rhetoric used by violence instigators.[178]

An additional key consideration is establishing collaboration that will last beyond the life of the aid program. In order to prevent a parallel economy that will collapse once the aid organization leaves, the training programs need to provide the skills that will benefit the local community. Additionally, the reconciliation programs should be built on the sustainable processes and structures that emanate from existing civil society, and give credibility to local leaders. This partnership with local leaders is essential to ensure the expansion of the peace process throughout the local community and to empower the leaders that are advocating disengagement from conflict.[179]

Finally, the peacekeeping and developmental organizations can take steps to ensure that incentives exist to promote interfactional cooperation. One method is to encourage economic interdependence by linking local production and consumption initiatives between former belligerents. As an example Luo, Kuria, and Maasai ethnic leaders in Kenya defused tensions that were escalating from a sustained resource conflict by donating land for an agricultural and livestock development training center. The center brought together pastoralists and farmers from the different groups, provided a reconciliation process to address issues remaining from the conflict, and created economic linkages between the ethnicities that created financial benefits for all the groups, reinforcing the motivation for further collaboration. The combination of local

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[178] Prendergast and Plumb, *Building Local Capacity: From Implementation to Peacebuilding*, 332-333.

[179] Ibid., 332-333.

leader involvement, reconciliation efforts, and economic incentives for collaboration resulted in a decrease in cattle raiding and ethnic clashes, and provided a model that was used successfully in neighboring communities.[180]

D. INTERNATIONAL PRIORITIES

1. Aligning Macro-Economic Policies with Peacekeeping Objectives

The international community must address the gap that exists between macroeconomic policies and the impact they have on the population at the micro level. Macro-economic policies must bring both financial and social stability; thus, efforts to bring a government into fiscal solvency must be implemented in a manner that does not destabilize the government. The international community typically provides support to build infrastructure — police stations, courthouses, schools, and hospitals. However, it often refuses to fund salaries for the government employees that make up the security services, teachers, and hospital staffs. Further, macro-level economic policy has traditionally called for state austerity programs that call for the firing of state employees. This policy destabilizes the government and disrupts the state's ability to deliver public services, which in turn hinders development.

2. Targeting Rebel Financing

The control of commodities has allowed militant leaders to do extremely well financially, despite the economic hardship that the conflict creates for the vast majority of the state's population. For example, control of diamond reserves allowed Jose Savimbi, the leader of the group National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), to amass an estimated net worth of four billion dollars in the 1990s. Accordingly, the international community should aggressively target sources of rebel financing and should seek to reduce the profits militants can make through the sale of commodities. The Kimberley process provides one model of disrupting a militant organization's access to the markets. The Kimberley process began in 2002 as a certification system for rough diamonds that agreed to a minimum standard for certificates of origin to ensure that the

[180] Prendergast and Plumb, *Building Local Capacity: From Implementation to Peacebuilding*, 344.

diamonds were not produced by rebel groups. The process has established a sequence of internal controls that could be replicated in other commodity markets, such as coltan and timber. Additionally, international actors should seek to impose regulations within the commodity markets that reduce the customers for illegal goods and force militants to sell their items at a deep discount, which in turn reduces their profits.[181]

3. Mitigating the Risks from Natural Resources

A typical pattern develops after natural resources are discovered in a post-conflict country — an undefined amount of money starts flowing in; politicians and government employees divert much of it into their private bank accounts; and the masses are left nearly as poor as before and are increasingly angry.[182] Consequently, the international community in general and IFIs specifically must take steps to mitigate the risks that occur from natural resources before committing funds to develop the sector. The first step in this is developing the means to accurately report the revenues received from sale of the resources. Since the factions within the state often do not trust information provided by the government, corporations involved in the extraction of resources in post-conflict states should be required by law to provide independent reporting information. This information can be provided directly if deemed appropriate by the corporation. If confidentiality is warranted, individual companies can provide their information to an IFI, which then collates the data and provides the information in a single report. Failure to comply with this requirement should bring the threat of intervention by Security Council states and the delisting of the corporation from major stock exchanges.[183] By establishing a system where an outside entity reports on the revenues from natural resources, the international community can force a change to the system that would reduce the ambiguity that fosters corruption and patronage.

The second component to this process is reaching an agreement as to how the revenues from the resources will get distributed. The method used by the World Bank in

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[181] Collier et al., *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy*, 143-144.

[182] Abraham McLaughlin, "Africa's New Model for Spreading Oil Wealth," *Christian Science Monitor*, July, 28, 2004.

[183] Collier et al., *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy*, 129.

Chad starting in 2000 provides a template of taking the required actions to mitigate the risks of future conflict before pursuing development projects. Oil was found in Chad during the 1950s, but civil wars through the 1960s to 1990 made it impossible to extract. After 1990, Exxon tried to raise capital to start building infrastructure. However, the risks remained too high to attract private financing and it needed World Bank participation to raise the required capital and provide leverage over the government. Once the World Bank got involved, it mandated that Chad's government commit itself to transparency in the management of its oil income and that revenues must be used for poverty reduction programs.

This law resulted in the Petroleum Revenue Management Law that stipulates that all direct oil revenues must go to an offshore escrow account. From here, ten percent is transferred to a Future Generations Fund, 80 percent is committed to poverty reduction, five percent goes to the local communities in the oil producing region, and the remainder goes to administration expenses and general expenditures. Additionally, a watchdog organization, the *College de Controle et Surveillance des Ressources Peroliers*, has been created that certifies the parliamentary budget conforms to the petroleum law and authorizes all disbursements from the oil revenue account. This organization holds members from various organizations and includes two members from parliament, four from civil society organizations, a member from the Supreme Court, the treasury director, and the national director of Chad's central bank.[184] The checks and balances instituted through this system have diffused tensions that existed after the civil war. There is little talk of secession by the oil producing regions, and the population has a general sense that the oil revenues are getting used for purposes that benefit the country as a whole.

E. SUMMARY

Stabilization doctrine has traditionally emphasized development and security, and experience provides evidence of their interdependence. Michael Shafer notes that the doctrine attempts to address both ends of the instability equation: "development polices seek to ameliorate the overwhelming demands unleashed by social mobilization, and

[184] Collier et al., *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy*, 131.

security policies attempt to bolster the underwhelming capabilities of new states that they may manage disruptions while forging ahead with modernization."[185] Without security, development is impossible; without good government and economic progress, efforts to maintain it will be futile.

The actions must be made in a manner that does not undermine the fragile peace that exists in many post-civil war states. However, before implementing policies it is possible to identify many of the risk factors that can undermine international efforts. Identification of the threats then allows policymakers to tailor the response in a way that ensures the correct actions are done in a sequence that minimizes the threats that can bring the country back into conflict. In each of the areas studied, specific risk factors pose direct challenges to efforts to reform governance, establish security, and support economic development. Consequently, at a minimum the international community must demonstrate the commitment to contribute the resources and institute the policies required to effectively mitigate these risks. Failure to meet this minimum threshold across all three of these pillars results in the actions taken by the international community having no statistically significant effect on sustaining the peace. Moreover, responses by the international community that do not have the capacity required to account for these risk factors actually increase the probability of the state returning to civil war.

By assessing the risk factors present within the civil war state, policymakers have the ability to assess the post-conflict environment and decide if they are willing to make the commitment the state requires to be a force for peace. However, this requires coordination across multiple organizations to implement a comprehensive approach in stabilizing the state. Additionally, before committing peacekeepers, instituting governance reform efforts, or making economic assistance conditions and policies, the decision makers in each of these areas must have the ability to assess if risk conditions exist that would indicate their proposed actions will destabilize the state. If the institutions required to meet these challenges are unwilling to coordinate their effort and make the commitment to tailor their response to the needs of the post-civil war, the

[185] D. Michael Shafer, *Deadly Paradigms: The Failure of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1989), 79.

international community needs to resist the pressure to meddle in the state, implement policies that are doomed from the start, and exacerbate a bad situation.

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APPENDIX 1 — DEFINING CIVIL WAR

The basic definition of civil war shared across the literature defines civil war as occurring when an identifiable rebel organization challenges the government militarily and the resulting violence results in more than 1,000 combat-related deaths, with at least five percent on each side. However, Doyle and Sambanis thoroughly capture the multiple considerations that researchers must consider when categorizing conflicts and classify an armed conflict as a civil war when:

> 1. The war takes place within the territory of a state that is a member of the international system with a population of 500,000 or greater.[186]
>
> 2. The parties are politically and militarily organized and they have publically stated political objectives.[187]
>
> 3. The government (through its military or militias) is a principal combatant. If there is no functioning government, then the party representing the government internationally and/or claiming the state domestically must be involved as a combatant.[188]
>
> 4. The main insurgent organization(s) is locally represented and must recruit locally. Additional external involvement and recruitment need not imply that the war is not intrastate.[189] Insurgent groups may operate from neighboring countries, but they must also have some territorial control (bases) in the civil war country and/or the rebels must reside in the civil war country. This criterion eliminates interstate conflicts with no local participation from consideration.[190]

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[186] This includes states that are occupying foreign territories that are claiming independence (i.e., the West Bank and Gaza in Israel and the Western Sahara in Morocco). A strict application of this coding rule would drop these cases if the international community through the UN rejects the state's claim of sovereignty on the occupied territories.

[187] This applies to the majority parties in the conflict. The criterion distinguishes insurgent groups and political parties from criminal gangs and riotous mobs. "Terrorist" organizations would qualify as insurgent groups if they caused violence at the required levels for war. Noncombatant populations that are often victimized in civil wars are not considered a "party" to the war if they are not organized in militia or in some form able to apply violence in pursuit of their political objectives.

[188] Extensive direct support (monetary, organizational, or military) by the government to militias might also satisfy this criterion. In cases where the state has collapsed, it may not be possible to identify parties representing the state as all parties may be claiming to be the legitimate state regime, and these conflicts become hard to distinguish from intercommunal violence (i.e., Somalia after 1991).

[189] A civil war can occur at the same time as an interstate war.

[190] Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, *Making War & Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 133-134.

Additionally, the criteria for coding the start and end dates of the conflict are also specified. The criteria to determine the dates include:

> 1. The start year of the war is the identified as the first year the conflict causes at least 500-1000 deaths. If the conflict has not caused 500 deaths or more in the first year, the war is coded as having started that year only if the cumulative deaths in the next three years reach 1,000.[191]
>
> 2. Throughout its duration, the conflict is characterized by sustained violence at least at the minor or intermediate level. The war is coded as terminate if a three-year period occurs during which the conflict causes fewer than 500 deaths.[192] In such a case, the end date of the war is considered the last year that produced more than 100 deaths (unless one of the other rules applies).
>
> 3. Throughout the war, the weaker party is able to mount effective resistance. Effective resistance is measured by at least 100 deaths inflicted on the stronger party. A substantial number of these deaths must occur in the first year of the war. But if violence becomes effectively one-sided, even if the aggregate effective resistance threshold of 100 deaths has already been met, the civil war must be coded as having ended and the violence is considered to have transitioned to a politicide or other form of one-sided violence.[193]
>
> 4. A peace treaty that marks at least six months of peace marks an end to the war. Treaties that do not stop the fighting are not considered (i.e., the 1993 Islamabad Accords and the 1997 agreement among Somali clan leaders).
>
> 5. A decisive military victory by the rebels that produces a new regime marks the end of the war.[194] Since civil war is understood as an

[191] Given the difficulty in collecting accurate data to accurately determine civil war onset, if a good estimate of deaths does not exist for the first year, the onset is coded as the first year of reported large-scale armed conflict provided that the violence continues or escalates in the following years.

[192] Three years is an arbitrary cutoff point, but is a consistent threshold found in the literature. This coding rule is necessary to prevent coding an ongoing civil war for years after the violence has ended, and several cases have occurred where the coding of civil war termination has been determined by this criterion. A second, more lenient version that is also used is a five-year period with fewer than 500 deaths.

[193] This criterion distinguishes cases in which insurgent violence was limited to the outbreak of the war, and for the remainder of the conflict the government engaged in one-sided violence. A hypothetical example is a case where insurgents inflicted 100 deaths on the government in the first week of fighting, and then the government defeated the insurgents and engaged in pogroms and politicide for several years with few deaths on the government side.

[194] Thus, in secessionist wars that are won by rebels who establish a new state, if a war erupts immediately in the new state it is coded as a new war onset in the new state (i.e., Croatia in 1992-1995), even is the violence is closely related to the preceding war.

armed conflict against the government, continuing armed conflict against a new government implies a new civil war. If the government wins the war, a period of peace that last longer than six months must persist before considering renewed violence a new civil war.

6. A cease-fire, truce, or end to the fighting results in at least two years of peace.[195] The period of peace must be longer than what is required in the case of a peace agreement, as it is impossible to discern the parties' intent to negotiate an agreement in the case of a truce/ceasefire.

7. If new parties enter the war over new issues, a new civil war onset should be coded, subject to the same operational criteria stated above. If the same parties return to war over the same issues, this is generally considered a continuation of the old war, unless any of the above criteria for coding a war end apply for the period before the resurgence of fighting.[196]

[195] Peace implies no battle-related deaths, or in a lenient version of this criterion, fewer deaths than the lowest threshold of deaths used to code war onset (i.e., fewer than 100 deaths per year).

[196] Ibid., 134-136.

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APPENDIX 2 — METHODOLOGY OF PRIMARY VARIABLES

Dependent Variable: To measure *civil war onset*, many studies used the Uppsala/PRIO armed conflict dataset (Version 3.0) (Gleditsch et al., 2002; Strand, Wilhelmsen & Gleditsch, 2004). This thesis focused on internal conflicts and consequently only used studies focused on inter-state violence.

Independent Variables: The majority of the variables listed below come out of the Schneider Wiesehomeier study. They use the Golder (2004, 2005) dataset on democratic institutions as the primary source for their data.

Ethnic fractionalization: This variable is measured using Fearon (2003), who relied on the *Encyclopedia Britannica* and other sources; the fractionalization index ranges from 0 to 1 and is current to the year 2000.

Ethnic dominance: Studies used two different methods to measure ethnic dominance. Many studies used Collier (2001) or the updated Collier and Hoeffler (2004) classification of a dichotomous variable to measure ethnic polarization, coding the variable as positive if an ethnic group represents 45–90 percent of the population. Schneider and Wiesehomeier's study uses a narrower range of 60–90 percent of the population for this variable.

Ethnic polarization: Studies used the formula provided by Reynal-Querol (2002) to calculate ethnic polarization.[197] The variable equals 1 for cases of highly polarized societies and 0 for the others. Schneider & Wiesehomeier also introduce a dummy variable in their study to compensate for the high correlation between ethnic fractionalization and ethnic polarization.

Majoritarian system: This dichotomous variable is given the value 1 if a country uses a majoritarian electoral system; all other electoral systems receive a value of 0. The majoritarian category includes political systems that employ plurality rule as well as those that use absolute and qualified majority requirements.

[197] See also Reynal-Querol, 2005; Montalvo & Reynal-Querol, 2005.

Proportional system: This dichotomous variable indicates a value of 1 whether a country uses a proportional electoral formula with either a single tier or multiple electoral tiers. *Effective number of parties*: This variable indicates the effective number of electoral parties in a country. It was calculated with the formula from Laakso & Taagepera (1979), $1/\Sigma v_i^2$, where v_i is the percentage of the vote received by the *i*th party, and independents or others are treated as a single party.

Average district magnitude: This variable is calculated as the total number of seats allocated in the lowest tier divided by the number of districts in that tier. It is used alone and in conjunction with the majoritarian variable, under the thought that large districts offset the winner-takes-all logic of the plurality rule.

Federalism: This institutional variable is included to measure the degree of centralization, which may influence the risk of a civil war onset. This dichotomous variable was taken from Polity III and updated for the post-1994 years using Griffiths & Nerenberg (2005), Gerring & Thacker (2004), Gerring, Thacker & Moreno (2005) and, for African countries, Kuenzi & Lambright (2005). It is 1 when a country is geographically decentralized in terms of decision-making authority and 0 otherwise.

Presidential system: This is a dummy variable that is given the value 1 if a country is classified as a presidential democracy and 0 if not. The president may be elected directly or indirectly; the decisive criterion is whether a president is able to select a government and determine its survival. It was complemented for some African countries using Kuenzi & Lambright (2005).

Control Variables: The Schneider Wiesehomeier study includes control variables that proved to exert a robust influence on the risk of conflict in the meta-analysis of Hegre & Sambanis (2006) and other recent statistical studies on the causes of civil war onset.

Population size: This is an important control variable, since bigger countries produce for a larger domestic market and are less outward looking economically as a consequence. The Penn World Tables Version 6.1 (Heston, Summers & Aten, 2002) provided the data.

Economic development: This variable will be measured through the GDP per capita, with data from the Penn World Tables Version 6.1 using its log transformation.

Regime durability: In their studies, Hegre et al. and Fearon and Laitin, provide evidence that political instability increases the risk of civil war onset. The Polity IV data set (Marshall & Jaggers, 2000) measures the polity durability since the last transition or since 1900.

Conflict duration: Various studies obtained their data for this variable from the Correlates of War database (Walter 2004). The measure varied from a duration low of one week to a high of 396 months and was calculated using a log transformation.

Conflict intensity: Hartzell and Hoddie operationalize this variable as an additional one thousand battle deaths per month employing a log transformation.

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APPENDIX 3 — TABLE OF CIVIL WAR VARIABLES

Table 6. Post-WWII Determinants of Civil War Onset

Variable	Study	Finding	
State Characteristics			
Population (ln)	Schneider & Wiesehomeier (2008)	S	$p<0.01$
Proximity of Independence	Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates, & Gleditsch (2001)	S	$p<0.01$
	Vreeland (2008)	NS	
Proximity of Civil War	Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates, & Gleditsch (2001)	S	$p<0.001$
	Vreeland (2008)	S	$p<0.05$
Neighboring Civil War	Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates, & Gleditsch (2001)	NS	
	Vreeland (2008)	NS	
Previous Regime Type	Hartzell, Hoddie, & Rothchild (2001)	S	$p<0.05$
	Hartzell & Hoddie (2003)	NS	
	Walter (2004)	NS	
Foreign Aid Levels	Grossman (1992)	NS	
	Collier & Hoeffler (2002)	NS	
War Resolution			
Decisive Victory	Walter (2004)	NS	
Grievances Settled	Walter (2004)	NS	
Partition	Walter (2004)	NS	
Government Type			
Democracy	Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates, & Gleditsch (2001)	NS	
	Schneider & Wiesehomeier (2008)	S	$p<0.01$
Liberal Democracy	Walter (2004)	NS	
Majoritarian	Schneider & Wiesehomeier (2008)	NS	
Federalism	Schneider & Wiesehomeier (2008)	NS	
Presidentialism	Schneider & Wiesehomeier (2008)	S	$p<0.01$
Proportional System	Schneider & Wiesehomeier (2008)	NS	
Semi-democracy	Henderson & Singer (2000)	S	$p<0.01$
Clear Autocracy	Walter (2004)	NS	

Government Reformation			
Proximity of Regime Change	Vreeland (2008)	S	$p<0.05$
Small Level of Democratization	Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates, & Gleditsch (2001)	S	$p<0.05$
Large Level of Democratization	Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates, & Gleditsch (2001)	NS	
Small Level of Autocratization	Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates, & Gleditsch (2001)	S	$p<0.05$
Large Level of Autocratization	Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates, & Gleditsch (2001)	S	$p<0.001$
Ethnic Factors			
Ethnic Basis to the Conflict	Hartzell, Hoddie, & Rothchild (2001)	NS	
	Hartzell & Hoddie (2003)	S	$p<0.05$
	Walter (2004)	NS	
Heterogeneity/Fractionalization	Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates, & Gleditsch (2001)	S	$p<0.05$
	Papaioannou and Siourounis (2006)	S	$p<0.05$
	Schneider & Wiesehomeier (2008)	NS	
	Vreeland (2008)	S	$p<0.05$
Ethnic Dominance	Henderson & Singer (2000)	NS	
	Schneider & Wiesehomeier (2008)	S	$p<0.01$
Polarization	Henderson & Singer (2000)	S	$p<0.05$
	Ostby (2008)	NS	
	Schneider & Wiesehomeier (2008)	S	$p<0.01$
Conflict Costs			
Conflict Intensity	Hartzell, Hoddie, & Rothchild (2001)	S	$p<0.001$
	Hartzell & Hoddie (2003)	S	$p<0.01$
	Walter (2004)	NS	
*Conflict Duration**	Hartzell, Hoddie, & Rothchild (2001)	S	$p<0.01$
	Hartzell & Hoddie (2003)	NS	
	Walter (2004)	S	$p<0.01$
Development (ln)			
	Auvinen (1997)	S	$p<0.05$
	Collier & Hoeffler (1998)	S	$p<0.01$
	Henderson & Singer (2000)	S	$p<0.01$
	Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates, & Gleditsch (2001)	S	$p<0.05$
	Walter (2004)	S	$p<0.01$
	Collier & Sambanis (2005)	S	$p<0.01$
	Collier, Hoeffler, & Soderbom (2008)	S	$p<0.05$
	Schneider & Wiesehomeier (2008)	S	$p<0.05$
	Vreeland (2008)	S	$p<0.05$

Poverty	Goldstone et al. (2003)	S	$p<0.05$
	Fearon & Laitin (2003)	NS	
	Collier & Hoeffler (2004)	S	$p<0.01$
	Sambanis & Hegre (2006)	S	$p<0.01$
	Alexander (2007)	NS	
Natural Resources			
General			
	de Soya (2002)	S	$p<0.05$
	Addison, Le Billon & Murshed (2003)	S	$p<0.05$
	Fearon & Laitin (2003)	NS	
	Collier & Hoeffler (2004)	S	$p<0.01$
	Mueller (2004)	S	$p<0.01$
	Ross (2004)	S	$p<0.05$
	Fearon (2005)	NS	
	Bates (2008)	NS	
Oil	de Soya (2002)	S	$p<0.01$
	Addison, Le Billon & Murshed (2003)	S	$p<0.01$
	Fearon & Laitin (2003)	S	$p<0.05$
	Ross (2003)	S	$p<0.01$
	Ross (2004)	S	$p<0.01$
	Collier & Hoeffler (2004)	S	$p<0.05$
	Fearon (2005)	S	$p<0.05$
	Bates (2008)	S	$p<0.05$
Peace Agreement Features			
Power sharing Institutions	Hartzell & Hoddie (2003)	S	$p<0.01$
Territorial Autonomy	Hartzell, Hoddie, & Rothchild (2001)	S	$p<0.05$
Third-party enforcer	Hartzell, Hoddie, & Rothchild (2001)	S	$p<0.001$
	Hartzell & Hoddie (2003)	S	$p<0.01$

* Variables in italics indicate factors that reduce the likelihood of civil war onset.
S=Significant Correlation
NS=Not Significant Correlation

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